Philosophical Practice as Self-modification:  An Essay on Michel Foucault’s  Critical Engagement with Philosophy by Raffnsøe, Sverre et al.
 © Sverre Raffnsøe, Morten Sørensen Thaning, Marius Gudmand-Høyer 
ISSN: 1852-5203 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v25i2.5573 
Foucault Studies, ​No. 25, 8-54, October 2018  
ARTICLE 
Philosophical Practice as Self-modification:  
An Essay on Michel Foucault’s  
Critical Engagement with Philosophy  
SVERRE RAFFNSØE, MORTEN S. THANING, MARIUS GUDMAND-HØYER 
Copenhagen Business School, Denmark 
 
ABSTRACT. ​This essay argues that what makes Michel Foucault’s oeuvre not only stand apart              
but also cohere is an assiduous philosophical practice taking the form of an ongoing yet concrete                
self-modification in the medium of thought. Part I gives an account of three essential aspects of                
Foucault’s conception of philosophical activity. Beginning with his famous characterization of           
philosophy in terms of ​ascēsis, it moves on to articulate his characterization of philosophical              
practice as a distinct form of meditation, differing from both Cartesian meditation and Hegelian              
meditation, as it aims to stand vigil for the day to come and operates as a preface to                  
transgression. Part II begins the articulation of crucial traits left implicit in this understanding of               
philosophy by turning to Foucault’s in-depth investigation of philosophy in Antiquity during his             
lectures at the Collège de France in the 1980s. First, it develops how philosophy here begins to                 
constitute and distinguish itself by establishing itself as an activity that has a privileged              
relationship to truth and truth-telling as an unremitting, existentially determining challenge for            
the philosopher. Further, it instantiates how Platonism elaborates the need for a sustained             
‘auto-ascetic’ ethical non-compliant differentiation as the condition of possibility for accessing           
and stating truth, and then describes how the assertion of an ethical differentiation and attitude               
in Cynicism takes the form of an insistent combat for another world in this world. Finally, it                 
underlines how the ethical-practical philosophical work upon oneself in Antiquity is developed            
in an ongoing critical and political exchange with others. Part III indicates how ethical              
differentiation according to Foucault remains an essential precondition for the practice of            
philosophy and is further developed in the modern age. This is particularly perspicuous in              
Kant’s determination of the Enlightenment, in the attitude of modernity exemplified by            
Baudelaire, and in the history of revolt since the beginning of early Modernity. On this               
background, Part IV develops how philosophy as an ongoing meditative practice of            
self-modification leads to an affirmative critique, confirming the virtuality of this world in order              
to investigate the potentiality in the examined. In this manner, the essay presents Foucault’s              
philosophical practice as well as an outline of the history of ideas of a seemingly alternate, yet                 
still agenda-setting conception of philosophical practice today.  
Keywords: Philosophy, history of ideas, ​ascēsis, transgression, historicity of revolt, potentiality,           
virtuality, knowledge, truth-telling, Platonism, Cynicism, Enlightenment, Kant, Baudelaire,        
French Revolution, Iranian Revolution  
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INTRODUCTION 
Et hoc simile est, sicut si diceremus quod litterae scriberent seipsas in tabula 
[And this is similar, just as if we said it was the characters that wrote themselves on the writing 
tablet] 
Albert the Great, ​De anima, III. ​III​. ​II​, 27 
Michel Foucault exerts an overarching influence in our contemporary world. He has had             
and continues to have an enormous impact on the social sciences and the humanities;              
and through his reception in many instances and contexts, he also has an enormous              
impact on theory and practice more generally.  
Our ​ambition in this essay is to articulate the specificity that sets Foucault’s oeuvre              
apart within the sciences in general as well as within philosophy proper, a             
distinctiveness that forms an essential part of the strong attraction it exerts, even though              
it is usually insufficiently understood and often misconstrued. Our ​claim is that a salient              
feature in Foucault’s oeuvre that makes it stand out in a contemporary theoretical,             
scientific and analytic landscape is above all an ongoing assiduous philosophical           
practice. We claim that it is philosophy conceived and practiced as an ongoing yet              
concrete ​self-modification in the medium of thought that forms a connecting thread joining             
other recurring and shifting elements together. We also claim that Foucault from            
beginning to end had a long-standing ​Auseinandersetzung or critical exchange with           
philosophy as a work of thought upon itself and with the very act of writing as a                 
philosophical exercise of the self.  
Philosophy as a continuous self-modificatory practice in the medium of thought           
forms a coherent trajectory that links Foucault’s various diagnostic interventions. On           
this level, there is continuity rather than a constant revision of analytical tools in use that                
are reassigned in new studies and contexts. It is a continuity that is not to be found on                  
the level of specific positions, propositions or opinions, or on a thematic level where              
Foucault’s analyses can only be understood as ​disjecta membra of his oeuvre and as              
relatively isolated parts that result from a sudden conversion, only to be followed and              
ended by an equally sudden reconversion and abandonment. 
Concomitantly, this conception of philosophy differs from philosophy as a          
disciplinary approach or a specific mode of scholarship in favor of a history of thought               
that situates itself on the margins of scientific and practical knowledge while remaining             
in constant dialogue with traditional philosophical thought. In our view, this           
non-disciplinary and original renewal of philosophy is one of the major reasons why             
Foucault’s work has become so relevant for other disciplines.  1
1 In this essay, we aim to articulate Foucault’s philosophical practice as it establishes a coherent trajectory in                  
Foucault’s thought and articulates a form of philosophical practice that may still play an essential role                
today. In our recently published monograph, Sverre Raffnsøe, Marius Gudmand-Høyer and Morten S.             
Thaning: ​Michel Foucault: A Research Companion. Philosophy as Diagnosis of the Present ​(2016), we have already                
given an extensive account of certain transversal traits in Foucault’s oeuvre and approach. ​Recurrent in               
Foucault’s thought is, on the one hand, a diagnostic approach implying that he commits himself to                
“philosophy” as a “diagnostic activity” that investigates present phenomena and contemporary concerns            
while also “studying the space in which thought unfolds, as well as the conditions of that thought, its mode                   
of constitution” (Michel Foucault, “Qu’est-ce qu’un philosophe?” [1966], in ​Dits et Écrits I: 1954-1969, ​ed.               
Daniel Defert and François Ewald (1994), 553/Michel Foucault, “Philosophy and the Death of God” [1966],               
in ​Religion and Culture by Michel Foucault, ​ed. Jeremy R. Carrette (1999), 85-86). On the other hand, we have                   
outlined certain traits that mark Foucault’s philosophical thought – e.g. its contextual character, its              
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Our argument comprises four parts. Part I gives an account of three essential aspects              
of Foucault’s conception of philosophical activity that represent important prolegomena          
for the understanding of philosophy as self-modification in the medium of thought. To             
this effect, we focus on Foucault’s meta-philosophical reflections on his philosophical           
practice, employing key texts from his late as well as his early work in order to show the                  
continuity at play. We begin by focusing on his famous characterization of philosophy in              
terms of ​ascēsis ​in 1984. Then, we make use of a relative unknown but crucial text from                 
1963 to characterize Foucault’s conception of philosophical activity as a distinct form of             
meditation to be distinguished both from the Cartesian as and from the Hegelian ideas of               
philosophical meditation and contemplation. Following from this, the third section          
presents Foucault’s conception of philosophical practice as an anticipation of          
transgression. Even if these three aspects, ​ascēsis, meditation and transgression, are           
concepts in Foucault’s work that have been treated before, our synthesizing approach            
employs these meta-philosophical aspects to show how they establish a primary and            
enduring unity in his concrete philosophical activity.  
In the following three parts, we further articulate crucial traits of Foucault’s            
philosophy left implicit in the first part. Here, we turn to Foucault’s critical engagement              
with philosophy in Antiquity and Modernity to finally return to a more elaborate             
characterization of Foucault’s philosophical practice. Together, these parts present an          
outline of the history of ideas of a seemingly alternate, yet agenda-setting conception of              
philosophical practice today. 
Part II further articulates the historically created conditions of possibility for           
philosophy becoming a meditative self-modification in the medium of thought and the            
wider implications of this turn. Hence, it turns to Foucault’s in-depth investigation of             
philosophy in Antiquity during his lectures at the Collège de France in the 1980s. First,               
we develop how philosophy in Antiquity according to Foucault begins to constitute and             
distinguish itself by establishing itself as an activity that has a privileged relationship to              
truth and truth-telling as an unremitting, existentially determining challenge for the           
philosopher. Subsequently, we show how Platonism in Foucault’s rendering elaborates          
the need of an ethical differentiation in the form of an ongoing philosophical practice if               
one is to be able to state truth, even in dire straits. Then we develop how the assertion of                   
an ethical differentiation and a true life in Cynicism takes the form of an ongoing               
instantaneous combat for another world in this world. We end this part by summing up               
and arguing that, for Foucault, central strands in Ancient philosophy make it plain that              
it is an indispensable condition for good governance, for the establishment of healthy             
relationships, for assuming responsibility for one’s life and for living an authentic life to              
constitute an ​ethos, or a way of conducting oneself that one develops as an irreducible               
ongoing practice throughout one’s existence. 
normative commitment to yardsticks still in the making, the focus on event and experience, etc. – to such                  
an extent that they can be easily traced across his oeuvre. In this essay, however, we focus on another                   
salient feature of Foucault’s oeuvre and demonstrate how it forms a connecting thread that joins together                
both the diagnostic approach and the recurring traits mentioned. This connecting feature is philosophy              
conceived as self-modification, or, more precisely, philosophy understood and practiced as an ongoing yet              
concrete self-modification in the medium of thought prompted by the repetitive interrogation of present              
experiences. The path of Foucault’s philosophical thinking can be understood as a continuous endeavor to               
make use of historical investigation to challenge and substantially modify the ways in which we relate to                 
experiences of collective importance in our present practices and discourses and the ways in which we                
relate to ourselves. While a number of passages in this essay draw markedly on our previously published                 
monograph, we at the same time add substantially to the exposition of the self-modificatory trait. 
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Part III part returns to an examination of more patently contemporary discussions to             
develop how a deep-seated ethical differentiation for Foucault remains an essential           
precondition for the practice of philosophy in modern times as an allocutionary            
meditation committing itself to speaking the truth. We show this in a discussion of three               
genealogical instances instigated in the modern age. First, we make it plain how this              
conception of philosophy in Foucault’s reading becomes particularly perspicuous in          
Kant’s determination of the crux of Enlightenment and of the heritage of the French              
Revolution. Second, we indicate how an ethical differentiation for Foucault is re-enacted            
in contemporary terms with the attitude of modernity as it is exemplified by Baudelaire.              
Here ethical differentiation takes the form of a distantiation that attempts to transfigure             
or recreate a world that is at first experienced as ephemeral. Lastly, we specify how               
Foucault’s fascination with philosophy as ethical meditative differentiation also leads to           
his interest in the Iranian uprising against the Shah and a continued attention to the               
historicity of revolt and its virtuality.  
Moving closer to a characterization of crucial aspects of Foucault’s contemporary           
philosophical practice, Part IV articulates how philosophy as an ongoing meditative           
practice of self-modification combatting for another world in this world leads to an             
affirmative critique, confirming not the actual world, but the virtuality of this world, in              
order to investigate the potentiality in the examined. In this manner, Foucault’s            
parrēsiastic philosophical meditation on the faint and excited philosophical murmur          
rippling through the non-philosophical writes a preface to transgression that exhorts to            
stand vigil for the day to come.  
In short, as will become clear, the essay articulates how philosophy for Foucault             
remains a meditative practice of self-modification in the medium of thought, finding and             
testing its own reality in an insistent and restive address to political, social and scientific               
arenas as it not only distances itself ethically from established forms of knowledge and              
practice but also stands vigil for the day to come and offers a preface to transgression.                
The essay claims that this insistent ethical differentiation and self-modification is both            
what distinguishes Foucault’s philosophy from present predominant forms of         
knowledge and philosophy and what forms an essential part of the interest and             
attention it attracts. 
PART I 
THREE CRUCIAL ASPECTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL ACTIVITY  
AS SELF-MODIFICATION IN THE MEDIUM OF THOUGHT  
Throughout his itinerary, Foucault practices the philosophical exercise of thought upon           
itself as an ongoing and unremittent activity that must begin over and over again,              
prompted and reignited by its encounter with the non-philosophical present. What           2
establishes coherence in Foucault’s thought is the fact that he continuously turns            
towards the present over and over again to fathom its mode of being and understand               
the “ontology of the present, of present reality, an ontology of modernity, an ontology of               
ourselves.” However, this coherence becomes most patent when it is recognized that            3
2 See Michel Foucault, ​L’ordre du discours. ​Leçon inaugurale au Collège de France prononcée le 2 décembre 1970                  
(​1971), ​77-78/Michel Foucault, “The Discourse on Language” [1971], in The Archeology of Knowledge ​(1972),              
236. 
3 Michel Foucault, ​Le gouvernement de soi et des autres. Cours au Collège de France. 1982-1983 ​(2008), 22/Michel                  
Foucault, ​The Government of the Self and Others, Lectures at the Collège de France. 1982-1983 ​(2010), 21. 
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the attempt to comprehend this ontology of the present entails that Foucault’s own             
thought simultaneously remains implicated in this exercise to comprehend the ontology           
of the present. Essentially, the coherent continuity in Foucault’s work on a basic level is               
thus philosophy as the ongoing but concrete self-modification of thought and being as it              
makes itself felt through the repetitive interrogation of the present. 
1. Essay and ​ascēsis 
It is the particularity of this transformative capacity of philosophical thought that            
Foucault stresses in a well-known passage from the introduction to the second volume             
of his ​Histoire de la sexualité:  
What is philosophy today – philosophical activity, I mean – if it is not the critical work                 
that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavor to                  
know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of               
legitimating what is already known?   4
In the year of his death, Foucault here perceives philosophy not as the ability just to                
think differently in any possible way. Rather, philosophy is perceived as the ability to              
think differently in the very specific ways that springs from the specific            
self-modifications of previous modes of thought that prove necessary as philosophy           
encounters and tries to make sense of the non-philosophical. According to Foucault,            
philosophy “is entitled to explore what might be changed, in its own thought, through              
the practice of a knowledge that is foreign to it.”  5
Foucault comes to characterize both his previous studies and those that should follow             
as “studies of ‘history’” in so far as they investigate and refer to certain historical               
material, domains and problematics. However, he finds it even more important to stress             
the circumstance that they are not “the work of a ‘historian’.” This, he details, is due to                 
the fact that they “are the record of a long and tentative exercise that needed to revise                 
itself and be corrected again and again (​de se reprendre et de se corriger​). It was a                 
philosophical exercise: Its stake (​son enjeu​) was to learn (​savoir​) to what extent the effort               
(or work, ​travail​) to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks,                
and so enable it to think differently (​lui permettre de penser autrement​).” In this context,               6
Foucault further asserts that “the living substance of philosophy (​le corps vivant de la              
philosophie​)”, or more precisely, the living ‘embodiment’ of philosophy, is “the ‘essay’            
(​l’‘essai’​)”; and by using the French term for ‘essay’, he stresses the fact that philosophy               
lives on as a still unfinished and tentative mental attempt: a personal effort, but also a                
test of and an experiment with oneself that one makes in thought and language.              
Accordingly, Foucault also describes the philosophical essay as a “modifying ordeal or            
trial of oneself (​l’épreuve modificatrice de soi-même​).” In this sense, philosophical practice            7
is an enduring ordeal which one undergoes at the hands of thought, an ongoing ritual               
and ​rite de passage that modifies one’s manner of being, perceiving and thinking in              
uncontrollable and unpredictable ways as one enters the game of truth.  
4 Michel Foucault, ​L'usage des plaisirs. Histoire de la sexualité 2 (1984), 14-15/Michel Foucault, ​The Use of                 
Pleasure. The History of Sexuality 2 ​[1984]​ ​(2006), 8-9. 
5 Foucault, ​Usage des plaisirs,​ 15/​Use of Pleasure,​ 9. 
6 Ibid. 15/9; trans. modified. 
7 Ibid., 15/9; trans. modified. Somewhat misleadingly, the English translation renders “L’ ‘essai’ – qu’il faut                
entendre comme l’épreuve modificatrice de soi-même dans le jeu de la vérité” as “the ‘essay’ – which                 
should be understood as the assay or test by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes”. 
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In addition to emphasizing the importance of the essay as form, Foucault can             
therefore also characterize his practice of philosophy as “an ‘ascesis’”, or “an exercise of              
oneself (​un exercice de soi​) in the activity of thought (​dans la pensée​).” Doing so late in his                  8
work, Foucault situates himself in continuance of an ancient Greco-Roman tradition in            
which one imposed limitations on oneself and one’s immediate existence, although not            
to remain within these confinements, but rather to permit and force oneself to modify              
and transgress oneself. Foucault’s suggestion in the second volume of his ​Histoire de la              
sexualité that philosophy is an ‘essayistic’ practice in so far as it constitutes a test of the                 
self in the medium of thought draws upon his work on ‘self-tests’ as an essential               
dimension of practices or techniques of the self, conducted in particular in his lectures at               
the Collège de France ​L’herméneutique du sujet (The Hermeneutics of the Subject) ​from 1982.              
Here he investigates simple cases of self-testing in Pythagorean contexts and pursues            
this phenomenon as it develops into more sophisticated and extensive forms of testing             
in Epicurean and Stoic thought. Techniques that have the character of tests undertake             
the reflexive attempt to treat the present as a test, i.e. as something that has the potential                 
of providing the subject with self-insight. The tests articulated in Hellenistic philosophy            
seek to elicit a particular ​enacted form of reflectivity ​as the tests should help the subject to                 
adopt “a certain enlightened and conscious attitude towards what one is doing and             
towards oneself doing it.”   9
Viewing Foucault’s characterization of philosophy as a self-test on the background of            
his earlier investigations into self-testing in Hellenistic philosophy, also underlines a           
crucial trait in Foucault’s conception which shall seek to characterize more precisely in             
the following sections: Whereas the Hellenistic forms of thought are intended to modify             
the subject by strengthening his independence in relation to his affective life, i.e. to              
solidify individual self-sovereignty, Foucault’s conception of philosophy points to a          
more profound or radical form of self-modification. Here the aim is not Stoic             
independence or sovereignty but rather the purpose is to employ philosophy in order to              
bring about decisive, uncontrollable and unpredictable, effects upon oneself.  
In retrospective, Foucault views self-modification and self-conversion as crucial         
components of his philosophical writing throughout his career. When towards the end            
of his life he discusses his own book on the French writer of formal constraints, ​Raymond                
Roussel, which was published at the beginning of Foucault’s career in 1963, Foucault             
directs attention to the fact that self-modification and the ability to re-conceptualize the             
present and one’s own existence has been a life-spanning, driving force and a central              
aim for his undertaking in general:  
It is true that the first text one writes is neither written for others, nor for who one is:                   
one writes to become someone other than who one is. Finally there is an attempt at                
modifying one’s way of being through the act of writing.  10
2. Meditation  
Upon closer inspection, self-modification in the medium of thought also implies a            
meditative relation in which philosophy turns towards itself and examines itself and its             
8 Ibid. 15/9. 
9 Michel Foucault, ​L'herméneutique du sujet. Cours au Collège de France. 1981-1982 ​(2001), 412/Michel Foucault,               
The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Lectures at the Collège de France. 1981-1982 ​(2005),​ ​431. 
10 Michel Foucault, “Archéologie d’une passion” [1984], in ​Dits et écrits IV: 1980-1988, ​ed. Daniel Defert and                 
François Ewald (1994), 605/Michel Foucault, “Archaeology of a passion,” in ​Foucault Live (Interviews,             
1961-1984​), ed. Sylvère Lotringer (1996), 404. 
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own mode of being. This is a kind of philosophical meditation that Foucault continues to               
nurture as a life-long ambition, since this test of thought forms an essential precondition              
for philosophy to become a modifying self-ordeal and thus for urging philosophy on as              
a still unfinished attempt and experiment in the medium of thought. 
In the philosophical tradition, meditation is a well-known recurring way to practice            
self-examination. An outstanding example is Descartes’ ​Méditations métaphysiques        
(Metaphysical Meditations). ​In Descartes, thought turns towards itself to critically examine           
its own preconceived certainties and assumptions. For Descartes, it seemed essential to            
withdraw from the world into one’s own world if one were to meditate properly. At the                
beginning of his first ​Meditation, Descartes stressed how he “procured” himself “a quiet             
time in quiet solitude” and “released” his “mind (​esprit​) from all cares”, sat down “by               
the fire”, in “a winter gown”, to “cast aside all my former opinions.” Likewise, at the                11
beginning of his third meditation, Descartes mentions how he “will shut his eyes”, “stop              
his ears”, “withdraw all my senses”, “give no heed to them, as being vain and false, and                 
by discoursing with myself, and prying more rightly into my own inner being, will              
endeavor to make myself little by more known and familiar to myself.”  12
Contrary to Cartesian meditation, however, Foucault’s meditation gives prominence         
to “the knower’s” chance to “get free of himself (​se deprendre de soi-même​)” and his               
“straying afield of himself (​l’égarement de celui qui connaît)​” as an essential motivation             13
for philosophical passion and curiosity. Despite his marked interest in meditation as an             
ascetic exercise of oneself in the activity of thought, Foucault thus nevertheless displays             
a marked reticence to the specific meditative approach practiced in the Cartesian            
tradition.  
An important example of this is found in the famous exchange with Jacques Derrida              
concerning the status of Descartes’ ​Méditations métaphysiques. Here Foucault labours the           14
point that there is a material difference of crucial importance between a meditation and              
a demonstrative discourse. In a demonstrative discourse, the subject remains “not           
implicated in the demonstration”, “fixed, invariable, and as if neutralized” “in relation            
to it”. On the other hand, a meditation  
produces, as so many discursive events, new utterances that carry with them a series              
of modifications of the enunciating subject: through what is said in meditation, the             
subject passes from darkness to light, from impurity to purity, from the constraint of              
passions to detachment from uncertainty and disordered movements to the serenity of            
wisdom, and so on. In a meditation, the subject is ceaselessly altered by his own               
movement; his discourse provokes effects within which he is caught; it exposes him to              
risks, makes him pass through trials or temptations, produces states in him, and             
confers on him a status or qualification he did not hold at the initial moment. In short,                 
meditation implies a mobile subject modifiable through the effect of the discursive            
events that take place.   15
Accordingly, Descartes’ meditations have an important “ascetic” thread and must be           
seen as “an exercise modifying the subject”. They should not only be read as “a group of                 
propositions forming a system” but also understood as  
11 René Descartes, ​Méditations métaphysiques ​[1647] (1979),​ ​66-69; trans. by authors.  
12 Descartes, ​Méditations, ​96-97; trans. by authors. 
13 Foucault, ​Usage des plaisirs,​ 14/​Use of Pleasure, ​8; trans. modified. 
14 See Raffnsøe et al., ​Michel Foucault​, 100-101, 116-117. 
15 Michel Foucault, “Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu” [1972], in ​Dits et écrits II​: ​1970-1975, ed. Daniel Defert and                    
François Ewald (1994), 261-262/Michel Foucault, “My body, this paper, this fire”, ​History of Madness (​2009),               
563. 
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a group of modifications forming an exercise, which each reader must carry out, and              
by which each reader must be affected, if he wishes in his turn to be the subject                 
enunciating this truth on his own account.  16
Another relevant example of Foucault’s attempt to elicit aspects of his own philosophical             
practice in the idea of philosophical meditation can be seen in ​L’herméneutique du sujet​. In               
Greco-Roman and early Christian philosophy studied in these lectures, it is to be             
conceived as “a sort of exercise of thought, rather an exercise ‘in thought’ (​une sorte               
d’exercice de pensée, exercice ‘en pensee’​);” however not in the sense of “a game the subject                
plays with his own thought (​un jeu du sujet avec sa propre pensée​), with the object or                 
possible objects of his thought”, but in the sense of “a game that thought performs on                
the subject himself (​jeu effectué par la pensée sur le sujet lui-même​).” A meditation of this                
kind is not an “exercise carried out on thought and its content”, but “an exercise by                
which, through thought, the subject puts himself in a certain situation.” In            17
L’herméneutique du sujet​, ​Foucault pursues the conception of philosophy as meditation in            
an intriguing reading of Seneca’s ​Natural Questions​, which is juxtaposed and contrasted            
with Marcus Aurelius’ ​Meditations​. In this context, however, his intention is not to             18
characterize his own conception of philosophy in terms of meditation but more            
indirectly to explore the nature of the Stoic conception of meditation as a historically              
singular phenomenon. 
However, in an earlier text, Foucault gives a self-mirroring articulation of philosophy            
as an ongoing meditative auto-transformative practice. More precisely, the opening of           
“Guetter le jour qui vient” (“Standing Vigil for the Day to Come”), a review essay of                
French writer and philosopher Roger Laporte’s first major book ​La Veille ​(On Watch)​,             
published in 1963, seems quite relevant in our context. This text is of particular              
importance since it accentuates the ways in which a meditative practice that starts from              
a diagnosis of the present distinguishes itself from a more traditional philosophical            
meditation. Here Foucault, indirectly but not inadvertently, gives voice to the kind of             
philosophy that he tries to develop in an exemplary and condensed manner. 
With withering scorn, Foucault remarks that, like God in the creation, “Descartes            
meditated for six full days”, only to become “a physicist again” in all likelihood on the                
seventh day. Thus, the problem with Cartesian doubt is that philosophical meditation,            19
as it is practiced here, does not lead to the practice of self-problematization and              
self-modification that is critically important to Foucault, but, at the end of the day, rather               
to self-affirmation in the form of a confirmation of certainties that the subject already              
adheres to. 
In a marked contradistinction to this “evening meditation, the extension of a task that              
started long ago and that nightfall lightens” in which one severs the ties to the               
surrounding world and its fluctuations and retires and shuts oneself up in order to              
devote oneself to the study, recollection and worship of what finally proves to be the               
true constitutive invariants of an inner world, Foucault opts for a different kind of              
16 Foucault, “Mon corps,”​ ​258/“My body,” 563. 
17 Foucault, ​Herméneutique du sujet,​ 339-341/​Hermeneutics of the Subject, ​356-358.  
18 Ibid. 249-297/261-311. 
19 Michel Foucault, “Guetter le jour qui vient” [1963], in ​Dits et écrits I​, 261-62/Michel Foucault, “Standing                 
Vigil for the Day to Come” [1963], ​Foucault Studies ​19 (2015), 217. 
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meditation in his review of Laporte’s book. Noting that he knows very well that the               20
clarity of midday, which nightfall meditation after all depends on and seeks to purify              
and consume ​après coup​, in all serenity, at a stage when the essential is already               
consummated and not much happens, “is not here and that it is still far away,” Foucault                
refuses to shut his eyes and stop his ears. In line with his conception of philosophy as                 
diagnosis of the present, Foucault instead insists that it is indispensable to philosophical             
thought to remain perceptive and in touch with the world. 
An ongoing openness and ability to be affected by the world is deemed essential,              
since Foucault adheres to and strives to develop an “exercise of thought (​exercice de              
pensée​) and in the medium of thought (​exercice ‘en pensée’​).” In this he moves towards               21
something that has not yet arrived and is still in the process of arriving and tries to keep                  
up with and cope with something that is still dawning. He strives to articulate:  
what could truly constitute a reflection before the day, before the morning of each              
day? Calling it a reflection is already going too far, perhaps, rather, an exercise in               
thought and in language (​exercice de la pensée et du langage​) – in pensive speech (​de la                 
parole pensive​) –, which recedes from the earliest light, advances towards the night from              
which it comes, and endeavours cautiously to remain in a place without space, where              
eyes remain open, ears cocked, the entire mind alert, and words mobilized for a              
movement that they do not yet know?   22
In this manner, Foucault insists that the practice of philosophical meditation must            
assume the shape of a detailed inspection in the medium of thought of the way in which                 
one is affected as one perceives and finds oneself in a relationship with the world.   23
In “Guetter le jour qui vient”, Foucault also makes it clear that this is of consequence                
for how one is to perceive the purpose, contribution and responsibility of philosophy as              
an ongoing meditation. To some extent, this is in agreement with the Hegelian claim that               
philosophy should be radically contemporary in the sense that it should prove itself in              
the here and now instead forestalling the future at the expense of the present. Yet, even                24
though Foucault agrees that philosophical thought is situated in and speaks within a             
20 Foucault, “Guetter le jour,​" 262/“Standing Vigil,”​, 218. Cf. also the considerable disparity between this               
kind of meditative approach and phenomenological eidetic variation, as it is indicated by Foucault in               
Herméneutique du sujet,​ 340/​Hermeneutics of the Subject,​ 357. 
21 ​Herméneutique du sujet, 339/​Hermeneutics of the Subject, 356. It is worth noting that Foucault’s terminology                
remains consistent from the early article of 1963 to the late lecture of 1982. 
22 Foucault, “Guetter le jour,​"​ 261-262/“Standing Vigil,” 218. 
23 Borrowing terminology developed by Jacques Derrida in ​La voix et le phénomène. Introduction au problème                
du signe dans la phénoménologie de Husserl (1967) one might characterize this examination of the way one is                  
affected as an examination of “auto-affectation” (92-96): By turning towards the experience of being              
affected, “eyes open and ears cocked”, a rendering of the perceived impressions becomes perceptive that               
exceeds mere representation and re-renders them and “mobilizes them for a movement”, leading on and               
showing the way in directions that the senses are unable to anticipate. In lieu of a return to, repetition and                    
reaffirmation of an already established inner identity, a meditation on auto-affectivity articulates a             
movement that leads towards something that is still dawning – a dislocation that the meditation must                
surrender to, follow and measure up to. With auto-affection, a mode of being becomes perceivable in which                 
one continuously outdistances oneself. As a consequence, the movement of a being affected by the world                
must be examined and explored unremittingly in an ongoing exercise in thought and language. 
24 It is in ​Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts [1820] (1972), 12-14/​Elements of the Philosophy of Right ​[1820]                  
(1991), 21-23, that Hegel emphasizes how philosophy is “a son of its time (ein Sohn seiner Zeit)” and must                   
prove what it can do, here and now. Instead of deluding itself by imagining that it can simply “leap out of                     
(​überspringen​)” and ahead of “the present (​seine Zeit​)” to forestall the future, philosophical thought must               
find itself able to “dance” in the here and now, as Hegel forcibly puts it. If it wants to fully acknowledge                     
and remain faithful to its point of departure, philosophy must realize that it needs to overcome its innate                  
appetite for “issuing instructions on how the world ought to be (​das Belehren wie die Welt sein soll​).” 
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specific historical context, and shares the critique of philosophical self-delusion,          
Foucault still positions philosophical thought rather differently.  
Hegel states that the reason why philosophy should stop both forecasting and issuing             
instructions is its embeddedness, since philosophy’s implication in the present means           
that it always “comes too late” to perform this function. While in Hegel the owl of                25
Minerva flies at nightfall to probe and reconnoite an existing, dwindling landscape, for             
Foucault the owl of Minerva needs to spread its wings at daybreak to explore an               
unfamiliar and uncharted landscape still emerging before our eyes. While philosophy in            
Hegel comes after the fact as an attempt to recognize and reconcile the logic that it saw                 
unfold, philosophical meditation for Foucault is prompted and receives its impetus           
before the fact as an exploration of a world that is still appearing. Likewise, Foucault               
cannot help feeling that  
there is always something ludicrous in philosophical discourse when it tries, from the             
outside, to dictate to others (​faire la loi aux autres​), to tell them where their truth is and                  
how to find it, or when it works up against them in the language of naïve positivity.   26
Yet this is for the exact opposite reason. Philosophy is unfit to legislate and instruct               
because it enters and is practiced too early when everything is still in the making and                
unfinished. This conception of philosophy can be viewed as the reason for Foucault’s             
conviction that it “is entitled to explore what might be changed, in its own thought,               
through the practice of a knowledge that is foreign to it.”  27
As a consequence, Foucault’s kind of meditation entails attentiveness to a           
manifestation still taking place, an alertness in which one “stands vigil” for the day to               
come as it is still in becoming. In this sense, standing vigil is an attunement that leaves                 
the purely personal behind as it moves ahead to focus on and render that which “is ‘not                 
yet’ in the arriving following day, and which may never arrive and become real:  
What says, ‘not yet’ to the next day stands vigil: the eve is the day which precedes (​la                  
veille, c’est le jour qui precede​). Or more accurately, it is that which precedes each day,                
every possible day, including this day on which I speak, on which I speak because my                
language traces the rise of the day back to the anticipation of it. The eve (​la veille​) is not                   
the other day, the day before; it is today, even now, this simultaneous shortfall and               
excess that borders on and surpasses the day, and due to which the day inexorably               
25 Hegel writes that: “As the thought of the world, philosophy appears only at a time when actuality (​die                   
Wirklichkeit​) has gone through its formative process (​ihren Bildungsprozess vollendet​) and attained its             
completed state (​sich vertig gemacht hat​)” (​Philosophie des Rechts, 14/Philosophy of Right, 23). Thus, “when               
philosophy paints its grey in grey”, it is an indication that we have passed midday and that the night is                    
approaching: “a shape of life (​Gestalt des Lebens​) has grown old, and it cannot be rejuvenated, but only                  
recognized, by the grey in grey of philosophy”. Consequently, “the owl of Minerva begins its flight with                 
the onset of dusk.” ​According to Foucault, however, philosophical meditation as diagnosis of the present               
begins with another kind of grey: not the grey that closes in after midday in the evening when the daylight                    
is fading, but the gray emerging before the morning as the day begins to break and a faint promising light                    
begins to shimmer through the haze. “In this ‘not yet’ of morning”, a grey appears which is “as though                   
diaphanous ​to its own transparency” (“Guetter le jour,” 262/“Standing Vigil,”18), and in which the shape               
of things to come begins to form. 
26 Foucault, ​Usage des plaisirs, 14-15/​Use of Pleasures, ​8-9. Literally this passage – “lorsqu’il se fait fort                 
d’instruire leur procès en positivité naïve” – translates to: “gives itself airs by instructing them in the                 
language of naïve positivity.” 
27 Ibid., 14-15/8-9. 
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comes and perhaps will never stop having not yet come. It is not me who is on watch                  
in the eve’s vigilance; it is the recoil of the coming day.  28
In Foucault, philosophical meditation is not the due consideration of what has proved             
essential. At a time when the world is still experienced as young and the present as                
arriving, a meditation appears which is a non-defensive open-mindedness focusing on           
and seeking to render what is not yet in the arriving day, articulating the excess in and                 
shortfall of the arriving day which may never fully arrive. Accordingly, this kind of              
meditation is not a reflection on being or on the present, but rather a meditative               
pre-meditation. It is an exercise of thought in thought prompted by the contemporary             
that turns towards and examines how one is affected and moved by this to lend “voice                
to the repetition of what has not yet taken place.” Like the “oscillation” on site of “a time                  
not yet inaugurated.”  29
3. Preface to transgression  
In addition to the elements of the essay, ​ascēsis and meditation, the through-going             
self-modificatory trait in Foucault’s philosophical practice also presents itself in a           
particular relation to transgression. When reiteratively lending voice to what has not yet             
happened, but which may be arriving in what is arriving in thought, we do not leave the                 
realm of philosophy, as Foucault stresses in “Preface to transgression”, an article on             
Bataille’s work published in 1963:  
We do not experience the end of philosophy, but a philosophy which can regain its               
speech (​reprendre la parole​) and pick itself up again in it (​se reprendre en elle​) only in the                  
marginal region which borders its limits (​sur les bords de ses limites​).   30
According to Foucault, the philosophical enterprise cannot itself be a transgression but            
only take the form of a preface to transgression, a run-up to going beyond, which marks                
its own finitude as it points further than itself towards something it sees dimly, but may                
never arrive at. Foucault does not consider this the end of philosophy, but rather, “the               31
breakdown of philosophical subjectivity” and “the end of the philosopher as the            
sovereign and primary form of philosophical language”. Whereas “the sovereignty of           
the philosophical subject” was continually re-constituted in Cartesian meditation,         
Foucault’s outwardly directed meditation in “philosophical language” opens “a soft and           
violent intrusion into the inwardness (​dans l’intériorité​), and makes it become beside            
itself (​hors de soi​)”, or ‘ecstatic’. In Foucault’s poetic language, this allows “voiceless             32
words to be born” and leads into a dark night in which a “dispersion of stars” shimmers                 
through.   33
Philosophy is “to draw as close as possible […] to that which precedes it” and stirs its                 
certainty, the present and its various occurrences which provoke us and provide food             
for thought. The idea is thus certainly not that this should permit philosophy to arrive               
at, or even come close to, “its final fulfilment”. Neither is the ambition that philosophy               
28 Foucault, “Guetter le jour,” 262-263/“Standing Vigil,” 218; trans. modified. 
29 Ibid. 265, 267/221, 222; trans. modified.  
30 Foucault, “Préface à la transgression” [1963] in ​Dits et écrits I, 242/Michel Foucault, “Preface to                
Transgression” [1963], in ​Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ​ed. Collin            
Gordon (1980), 41; trans. modified. 
31 Foucault, “Préface à la transgression,” 235/“Preface to Transgression,” 32; trans. modified. 
32 Michel Foucault, ​La pensée du dehors [1966] (1986), 47/Michel Foucault, “Maurice Blanchot: The thought               
from outside” [1963], in ​Foucault/Blanchot​ (1987), 47. 
33 “Préface à la transgression,” 242-43/“Preface to Transgression,” 42-43; trans. modified. 
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should remain turned backwards while staying as close as possible to that “which             
precedes it”. The crucial task for philosophy is to install itself in continuous and              
repeated contact with the non-philosophical while avoiding becoming disconcerted or          
going “beyond concepts.” However, in order to avoid reducing the “singularity of            
history, the regional rationalities of science, the depths of memory in consciousness,”            
philosophy must concomitantly turn towards itself in order to “to pick them up again              
(​reprendre​)” “to think them (​penser​)” in the medium of thought and to “reveal” “the              
sense, meaning and direction this non-philosophy has for us (​révélant le sens que cette              
non-philosophie a pour nous​).”  34
Turning towards itself in continuous contact with the non-philosophical, philosophy          
becomes an ongoing meditation that is existentially differentiating in that it challenges            
philosophy to relate itself to specific tendencies in the present in order to think              
differently in specific ways. Moreover, this differentiating movement even moves          
forward beyond the immediately perceived as it results in an anticipation and a             
pre-meditation of what it might imply. Yet this ecstatic element and moment of             
presentiment does not transport philosophy beyond itself. Philosophy points the way           
ahead as it is mirrored within philosophy. As Foucault puts it:  
Transgression, then, is not related to the limit as black to white, the prohibited to the                
lawful, the outside to the inside, or as the open area of a building to its enclosed                 
spaces. Rather, their relationship takes the form of a spiral which no simple infraction              
can exhaust.  35
As he tried to escape both traditional philosophical meditation and Hegelianism,           
Foucault thus finds himself brought back to them, “only from a different angle” and has               
to face them and figure out how he can pass through them in order to try to “leave”                  
them “behind once more” as he tried to anticipate a different mode of being for               
philosophy.  36
PART II 
FOUCAULT’S PHILOSOPHICAL ANTIQUITY:  
HISTORICAL PRECONDITIONS FOR PHILOSOPHY  
BECOMING A MEDITATIVE SELF-MODIFICATION  
This conception and practice of philosophy as a self-modification in the medium of             
thought that does not seek transgression as such but explores only its preface remains              
present throughout Foucault’s entire oeuvre. In Foucault’s work in the 1980s, the            
conception of philosophy as self-modificatory practice becomes a dominant theme of           
research. This exploration culminates in Foucault’s lectures in 1982-84. By investigating           
the genealogy and the constitution of the philosophical attitude – not primarily            
concerned with legislating or an unconditional search for true knowledge but rather            
with the establishment of philosophical meditation as self-modification in the medium           
of thought – Foucault here examines and articulates crucial traits and preconditions of             
this attitude that establish a different relationship between truth, individual existence,           
politics and morals.  
34 Foucault, ​Ordre du discours​, ​77-78/“Discourse on Language”, 236; trans. modified. 
35 “Préface à la transgression”, 237/“Preface to Transgression”, 35; trans. modified. 
36 ​Ordre du discours​, ​75/“Discourse on Language,” 235. 
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1. Truth-telling as an existentially determining ambition and challenge for the           
philosopher 
While Foucault re-initiated his continuing discussion of truth and truth-telling in his            
lectures at the ​Collège de Franc​e during the 1980s by setting off the manifestation of               37
truth as an irreducible and indispensable dimension, in the first instance he aimed at              
examining how the manifestation and extraction of truth is put to use in order to               
strengthen the exercise of power and the governance of others. However, his succeeding             
investigation can be said to take the reverse direction in so far as Foucault in his final                 
years increasingly comes to concentrate on the irreducibility of truth-telling with its            
widely ramified amplifications. Under the general headline of ​The Government of the Self             38
and Others, Foucault not only devotes his lectures in 1983 and 1984, as well as the                39 40
contemporaneous lectures at Berkeley and Grenoble , to highlighting how, “in posing           41 42
the question of the government of self and others” an investigation of “the obligation              
and the possibility of telling the truth in procedures of government” permits to             
illuminate how “the individual constitutes itself as a subject in its relationship to itself              
and to others.” In fact, Foucault ends up dedicating the overall trajectory of these              43
37 Foucault picks up on his earlier examination of the unveilment of truth in Antiquity, already treated in                  
his ​Leçons sur la volonté de savoir. Cours au Collège de France. 1970-1971 ​(2011​)/Lectures on the will to know.                   
Lectures at the Collège de France. 1970-1971 (​2013), ​as he initiates an investigation of alethurgy in Antiquity                 
from ​Du gouvernement des vivants. Cours au Collège de France. 1979-1980 ​(2012)​/On the Government of the                
Living. Lectures at the Collège de France. 1979-1980 ​(2014)​ ​and onwards. 
38 For an overview, see Raffnsøe et al., ​Michel Foucault, 369-425. Whereas Foucault in the lectures 1979-80                 
states that “the verbal manifestation of the truth that hides at the bottom of oneself” “is not intended to                   
establish the sovereign mastery of oneself [​la maîtrise souveraine de soi sur soi​]”, the following year he begins                  
to accentuate that it is important to “replace the imperative to ‘know yourself,’ so characteristic of our                 
civilization, within a larger interrogation that serves as its more or less explicit context: What can one do                  
with oneself [​Que faire de soi-même​}? What work is to be carried out on oneself [​Quel travail opérer de soi​]?                    
How should one govern oneself [​Comment ‘se gouverner’​] by exercising actions [in which] one is oneself the                 
object, the domain in which they are applied, the instrument they make use of and the subject of these                   
acts?” (Michel Foucault, “Resumé de cours” [1981], in ​Subjectivité et vérité. Cours au Collège de France.                
1980-1981 ​(2014), 299/Michel Foucault, “Course summery” [1981], in ​Subjectivity and Truth. Lectures at the              
Collège de France. 1980-1981 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 293-294. Though receiving its final              
editing as late as 1981-82, the fourth volume of Foucault’s history of sexuality prolongs the previously                
established narrative and continues to examine the patristic problematization of the flesh from Justinian to               
Saint Augustine. See Michel Foucault, ​Les aveux de la chair. Histoire de la sexualité 4 (2018). For further                  
discussion of the transition, see Raffnsøe: “Michel Foucault’s confessions of the flesh,” review, ​Organization              
Studies,​ forthcoming, September 2018. 
39 Foucault, ​Le ​gouvernement de soi et des autres. Cours au Collège de France. 1982-1983​/​The Government of the                  
Self and Others, Lectures at the Collège de France. 1982-1983​. 
40 Michel Foucault, ​Le courage de la vérité. Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II. Cours au Collège de France.                     
1984 (2009)/Michel Foucault, The Courage of Truth. The Government of the Self and Others II. Lectures at the                  
Collège ​Michel ​de France 1983-1984​ (2010), 1-22. 
41 Michel Foucault, ​Fearless Speech ​[1983] (2001), 11-173. In addition to this series of lectures, originally                
entitled “Discourse and Truth” when given at the University of California at Berkeley in the fall term of                  
1983, Foucault also gave a proceeding single lecture, “The culture of the self” (April 12, 1983), followed by a                   
number of discussions with students and faculty at the university. These have been translated and               
published in French in Michel Foucault, “La culture de soi” [1983], in ​Qu’est-ce que la critique? Suivi de La                   
Culture de soi​, ed. Henri-Paul Fruchaud and Daniele Lorenzini (2015), 81-187, while the original audio files                
in English can be consulted     
http://www.openculture.com/2014/08/michel-foucaults-lecture-the-culture-of-the-self.html​. 
42 Michel Foucault, “La Parrêsia” [May 18, 1982], in ​Discours et vérité, précéde de La Parrhêsia, ​ed. Henri-Paul                  
Fruchaud and Daniele Lorenzini (2016), 21-75/Michel Foucault, “Parrēsia” [1982], ​Critical Inquiry 41:2            
(2015), 219-253​.  
43 Foucault, ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres,​ 42/​Government of the Self and Others​, 42 
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lectures to an in-depth examination of the emergence of a dramaturgy of ​parrēsia, or              
free-spokenness, in Antiquity.   44
In this “modality of truth-telling” in which “the subject, who tells the truth, ​manifests              
himself […], represents himself and is recognized by others as speaking the truth,” a              45
certain “obligation of truth,” a certain dramatic and risky “ ‘binding oneself to the truth,’               
a certain ‘binding oneself by the truth and by truth-telling’,” becomes a decisive activity              
for the individual agent to engage in and in which its self is asserted and finds                
expression to such an extent that not only is its very exercise of freedom at stake, but                 
also its assumption of responsibility and its authenticity are ascertained and checked.  46
What is more, however, realizing that the philosopher in Antiquity from the fourth             
century BC and onwards (re)appears as a novel creature that begins to constitute and              
articulate itself in and through a discussion of the basic conditions for meeting the              
challenges in stating the truth in such a manner that it may serve to guide and organize                 
political life as well as the course of life for those in charge of political life, Foucault                 
consequently directs his attention to an investigation of the constitution of philosophical            
practice as a specific form of practice that distinguishes itself from (and asserts itself              
with regard to) other related forms of practice and techniques, such as rhetoric and              
pedagogics, precisely by virtue of the fact that it establishes a privileged relationship to              
truth and truth-telling as an unremitting, existentially determining, ambition and          
challenge for the philosopher. In and through this insistent examination of the            47
composition of another way to devote oneself to and enunciate the truth, converse to              
traditional political and legislative truth-telling, which is that of philosophy, and where            48
it becomes a crucial issue whether the philosopher over and over again is capable of               
establishing his own existence in a lifelong commitment to render, in word and in deed,               
a truth that the philosopher cannot have and hold, Foucault manages to give             
prominence to a form of philosophical practice that differs decisively not only from             
philosophy in its previous sense but also in its Aristotelian and modern sense where it               49
is committed directly to knowledge for the sake of knowing. Concomitantly, Foucault            
articulates how philosophy as the work of the self on (it)self (​le travail de soi sur soi​)                 50
committed to leading “the true life and the life of truth” is intimately related to the                
44 At the beginning of 1984 lectures​, Foucault sums up the defining relational characteristics of ​parrēsia in                 
this manner: “in two words, ​parrhesia is the courage of truth in the person who speaks and who, regardless                   
of everything, takes the risk of telling the whole truth that he thinks, but it is also the interlocutor’s courage                    
in agreeing to accept the hurtful truth that he hears” (​Courage de la vérité​, 14/​Courage of Truth​, 13). 
45 Ibid., 4/2-3. 
46 ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres​, 64-67/​Government of the Self and Others​, 66-69. For a development of the                   
relationship between parrēsia and other cognate terms, see Stanley B. Marrow, “‘Parrhēsia’ and the New               
Testament,” ​The Catholic Biblical Quarterly​ 44:3 (1982), 431-446. 
47 ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres​, 178, 180/​Government of the Self and Others​, 194, 196. 
48 Whereas the key objective for political truth-telling is to muster the courage to set the agenda in the right                    
way and for traditional philosophico-juridical truth-telling to legislate and state the basic conditions for              
social interaction, according to Foucault the aim for the philosophical injunction to tell the truth is not that                  
you will “be Solon.” Instead, you must “be Socrates” (​Courage de la vérité​, 75/C​ourage of Truth​, 81). 
49 “There was already a strong ancient tradition, perfectly attested in the fifth century, that the philosopher                 
was, could be, and had to be a lawgiver (a ​nomothetes) in the city, or else a peacemaker, the one who                     
succeeded in adjusting the balance of the city in such a way as to put an end to dissensions, internecine                    
struggles, and civil var. The philosopher was in fact a lawgiver, a peacemaker for the city. But in the scene                    
of Plato and Dion confronted by Dionysius, the philosopher makes his appearance as a parrhesiast, as the                 
person who, in a particular political conjuncture, tells the truth on the political stage, in order to guide                  
either the city’s policy or the soul of the person who directs the city’s policy” (Foucault, ​Gouvernement de soi                   
et des autres​, 178/​Government of the Self and Others​, 194-95). 
50 Ibid., 224/242. 
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conception of truth as a test and an alterity, challenging already received forms of life,               
discussed in the first section of this essay.   51
2. ​Parrēsia​ at the Platonic crossroads 
To give an account of the crucial traits distinguishing this new kind of philosophical              
practice that is beginning to come into existence, Foucault, at first and above all, turns to                
face what he describes as “the Platonic crossroads.” By this, he refers to the junction               52
where this new kind philosophy labors to define itself and its own specific kind of               
truth-telling in opposition to other competitors offering to speak the unvarnished truth            
on the agora, at the court or in the court-room, especially the philosophical tradition as it                
had been conceived so far, pedagogics and rhetoric. In fact, philosophy labors so hard to               
define itself that “the whole of Plato’s philosophy” according to Foucault “finds itself             
presented (​se trouve présenté​) in this problem [concerning how to define, articulate and             
assert a specific form of philosophical truth-telling]” and that not only “many of Plato’s              53
texts could be re-read in this perspective,” but also “all of Platonic philosophy could be               
seen from the perspective of the problem of truth-telling in the field of political              
structures and in terms of the philosophy/rhetoric alternative.” Recognizing that this           54
defining ‘Platonic’ moment of philosophy is not only voiced in texts attributed to Plato,              
Foucault’s reading is quite wide. Yet, it focusses on, in particular, Plutarch’s description            
of the character of Plato’s philosophical truth-telling, when the latter seeks to give              55
counsel at the court of Syracuse​, even as it includes Plato’s discussion of Socrates’              56
philosophical attitude and way of life depicted in The ​Apology of Socrates and other early               
Platonic dialogues, and it highlights Plato’s ‘autobiographical’ account of his own           57
attempt at philosophical truth-telling in Syracuse in his letters.  58
The ‘Platonic’ experience of philosophy can be said to be offered in response to a               
severe crisis marking Greek public life in general and upsetting established modes of             
truth-telling in particular. Whereas Thucydides’ ​History​, ​still in its description of the            59
early historical stages of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC), depicts a public life in              
which ​parrēsia above all plays a positive role and in which the possibility and the               
courage to speak the truth in public is recognized as momentous for political life and its                
ability to discern and decide, the dangers and risks connected with truth-telling            
subsequently come to occupy the foreground. In the course and aftermath of the             
Peloponnesian War, thus, the prospects of being able to speak out freely and the value of                
parrēsia is increasingly questioned around the middle of the following century in            
particular in texts such as Isocrates’ ​On the Peace​, among others​. While there is an acute                60
51 ​Courage de la vérité​, 308/​Courage of Truth​, 338. 
52 ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres​, 180-81/​Government of the Self and Others​, 196-97. In fact, Foucault                 
considers the problematics studied by him so all-pervasive and redefining for the understanding of Plato’s               
philosophy that “it is difficult to talk about ‘truth and politics’ with regard to Plato without making another                  
general exposition, another general re-reading of his work” (ibid., 181/197). 
53 Translation rectified by authors 
54 Ibid. 180-81/196-97. In fact, Foucault considers the problematics studied by him so all-pervasive and               
redefining for the understanding of Plato’s philosophy that “it is difficult to talk about ‘truth and politics’                 
with regard to Plato without making another general exposition, another general re-reading of his work”               
(ibid., 181/197). 
55 Plutarch, ​Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans, Dion, ​IV. 
56 ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres, ​47-52, 175-79/​Government of the Self and Others, ​48-54, 191. 
57 Ibid., 286-300/311-27. ​Courage de la vérité,​ 67-105/​Courage of Truth,​ 73-116. 
58 ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres​, 192-259/​Government of the Self and Others,​ 202-296. 
59 See Thucydides, ​History of the Peloponnesian War​, I.139-140, II.37,60. 
60 Isocrates, ​On the Peace, ​VIII.3. 
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awareness of the dangers and the sanctions that the speaker exposes himself to when              
speaking an unpalatable truth, inasmuch as the audience is quite likely to turn against              
the nuntius, there is equally a consciousness that listeners are quite likely to be              
convinced by the speakers who flatter them and tell them what they would like to hear,                
and are thus likely to arrive at the wrong decision as they mistake flattery for truth. 
In this conjecture where public ​parrēsia undergoes a severe crisis, the Platonic            
tradition of philosophy does not content itself with voicing severe criticism of traditional             
institutions and practices, including their pretentions to be privileged sites for the            
emergence of truth-telling. Instead, Platonism raises the bar insofar as it requests            61
philosophy to accept this challenge in order to remain philosophy. The essential            
touchstone for philosophy is whether it can make a decisive contribution to ensuring             
that the truth can appear and to clarifying the conditions for stating the truth in a proper                 
manner, even in these dire circumstances.   62
To respond to this challenge, however, philosophy needs go beyond being a mere             
representation of knowledge, as it is rendered in speech or text. Arguing the case for               
Plato’s move to Sicily in order to educate and counsel the tyrant, the ​Seventh Letter               
makes a decisive distinction between ​logos and ​ergon. When he deliberates whether he             
should go and take the risk of speaking out, it proves a decisive consideration for the                
author that Plato is “guided by his own regard for himself” and that it would appear                
that he as a philosopher is mere logos or “altogether mere hollow words (​logos monon               
atekhnos​)” which would never ever put his hand to work (​ergon de oudenos an pote hekon                
anapsasthai​).” Thus, from Plato’s ​Seventh Letter it is clear that philosophy with regard to              63
politics and truth-telling cannot simply be ​logos and ​mathesis, or an apprenticeship of             
knowledge that examines and passes judgment on its inherent truth and transmits it, in              64
order to give men laws and state the rules and norms according to which they should                
behave. Instead, the test or reality check for philosophy is that it is capable of facing                65
reality and putting its hand to action, finding and attesting to its reality for itself and                
others by proving itself capable of cutting through flattery, deception and delusion and             
by practicing veridiction and paving the way for practicing veridiction in the face of              
power and politics, thus contributing to their necessary (re)organisation.   66
Rather than stating what must be done in the realm of politics or prescribing directly               
how one should govern, or examining what is true or false in the realm of knowledge,                
philosophy is a practice that has a sustained privileged relationship to these fields, yet              
an unremitting relationship that is concomitantly one of exteriority, reluctance and           
indocility; and it is precisely in its capacity to forge this privileged and ambiguous              
relationship that philosophy may become and prove to be real.   67
As a consequence, the real of philosophy can also be said to be found in the dealings                 
with this relationship, as it is continually maintained and developed in a number of              
61 ​Courage de la vérité,​ 35/​Courage of Truth,​ 35. 
62 Philosophy, according to Foucault, becomes an endeavour to answer the question: “What is the mode of                 
knowledge (​savoir​), or what is the tekhne, what is the theory or what is the practice, what is the body of                     
knowledge (​connaissance​), but also what is the exercise, what is the mathesis and what is the askesis that                  
will make it possible to take up this parrhesia?” (G​ouvernement de soi et des autres, ​180/​Government of the Self                   
and Others​, 196, trans. modified). 
63 Plato, Letter 7, 328b-c. 
64 Foucault, ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres​, 201/​Government of the Self and Others,​ 219. 
65 Ibid., 325/255. 
66 ​Ibid. 212, 202/230, 219. 
67 Ibid. 221, 223-24/242. Plato, ​Letter​ 7, 341b. 
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practices. For this very reason, the tyrant Dionysius proves to be an impostor, refusing              68
the lengthy path of philosophy and unable to pass the test of philosophy, as he is able to                  
convince himself of having grasped the essentials in the course of Plato’s first lecture on               
philosophy and immediately proceeds to commit his impressions to writing in a            
philosophical treatise, without feeling the need to further educate himself. Rather than            69
in a sudden conversion or in the apprehension of certain pieces of knowledge             
(mathemata) provided by a master, which can be comprehended once and for all, written              
down, passed on and shared, the crux of philosophy is to be sought in a co-habitation or                 
living with ​(sunousia), a rubbing or friction ​(tribe) with the practice of philosophy, which              
renders it feasible that a light ​(phos) may be kindled and nurtured to finally grow by                
itself. What appears is thus philosophy, not as an apprehension of a given body of               70
knowledge ​(mathemeta) or of a given art ​(technē), but as an ​ascēsis, as a practice that finds                 
its test of reality in the relationship that one is able to establish with oneself, ​and in the                  
difference that this relationship is able to establish with regard to and within the              
political and social field.  71
In this manner, philosophy can not only be said to indicate the need for an “ethical                
differentiation” within political and social life as a necessary precondition if the truth is              
to appear, but also to begin to elaborate an ​ethos, the practical work upon oneself, that                
would permit this ethical differentiation, an elaboration that is closely related to an             
examination of the kind of access to the truth that would permit to form this kind of                 
ethos and an investigation of the political and social conditions in which this kind of               
truth and its ethos would be permitted to express and assert itself properly.  72
The elaboration of this ethical differentiation plays a crucial part in the set of Platonic               
dialogues dedicated to the discussion of the various stages leading to Socrates’ sentence             
and death. Whereas his trial is debated in the ​Apology, the ​Crito renders the discussion               
between Crito and Socrates concerning his possible escape and the ​Phaedo gives an             
account of the last moments before Socrates’ death. 
The ​Apology contains an examination of the question why Socrates does not engage in              
politics in the sense that he would take the floor to address the people and give advice to                  
the city, but instead chooses to seek out his fellow citizens independently. Part of the               73
reason Socrates gives is that it has become so risky to speak out in public that it is not                   
worth the effort and that he might not even have survived until now, had he chosen to                 
do so; but the main reason is that he has been called upon and given the even more                  
pressing mission to encourage his fellow citizens to take care of themselves, i.e. their              
reason ​(phronēsis), their truth ​(alētheia) ​and their soul ​(psychē). Socrates’ concern that we             74
should above all be concerned with ourselves and take special care of that part of our                
existence which is concerned with the truth and living the true life also proves decisive               
for his decision to stay in prison to happily face his death sentence, as his care for the self                   
and that of others makes him conclude that we should not care about the opinion of                
everybody and anybody but mainly about the judgment which enables us to decide             
what is just and unjust. Finally, Socrates’ famous last words to his disciples in the               75
68 Foucault, ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres, ​326/​Government of the Self and Others​, 354. 
69 Ibid., 227/246.  
70 Ibid. 226-37/245-55. Plato, ​Letter 7,​ 341b-d. 
71 ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres​, 202, 224, 211/​Government of the Self and Others​, 219, 242, 229. 
72 ​Courage de la vérité,​ 35, 63/​Courage of Truth,​ 35, 66. 
73 Plato, ​Apology,​ 31c. 
74 Plato, ​Apology,​ 29e. 
75 Plato, ​Criton,​ 48a. 
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Phaedo requesting them to offer a cock to Asclepius and urging them not be forgetful of                
this debt can be seen as a conscientious sacrifice to the god of healing thanking him for a                  
successful cure from a common disease that may attack the soul, the widespread falling              
prey to common false opinions and to unhealthy self-forgetfulness, a sacrifice to the             
benevolent god who helps us to cure ourselves when we take care of ourselves.   76
What is more, Socrates’ calling to concern himself with helping his fellow citizens             
concern themselves with taking care of themselves and their reason, their truth and their              
soul, forms a prime motive for the Socratic method as is developed in a number of                
Platonic dialogues. Whereas Socrates rejects the role of the master who passes on             77
teachings (​mathema or ​techne) to his students, and in this respect remains a student on               
par with the other students, he concomitantly takes up a position different from his              
interlocutors insofar as he administers a Socratic test that works as a touchstone ​(basanos)              
and permits to develop a parrēsiastic practice that one needs to repeat and profit from               
throughout one’s life.  78
What thus appears is philosophy as rupture with political activity in the strict or              
narrow sense of the word that permits to move from the ​polis to the ​psyche as the                 
essential correlate of the elaboration of truth and to elaborate a ​psychagogy: a transport              79
or guidance of the soul which is at the same time a testimonial of knowledge and truth; a                  
test of the soul, its courage and ability to tell and practice the truth; the practice or ​ascēsis                  
of the soul on itself; and a form of behaving and a way of life. As is evident in Socrates’                    80
life and response to his trial, this practice and test of the courage of truth, which cannot                 
primarily take place on the political platform, must be exercised onto death and becomes              
an overriding concern to the extent that it may supersede not only political activity but               
also the apprehension about one’s own bounded existence in its immediately given            
sense. 
3. The ethical exteriority of the Cynic approach  
At closer inspection, however, the Platonic crossroad is not alone in marking out and              
articulating this ethical differentiation and its implications. Whereas the constitution of           
this irreducible independent ethical dimension takes a relatively discrete inwardly          
oriented and esoteric form in Platonic academic philosophy, the contrary is the case in              81
other contemporaneous forms of philosophy according to Foucault. While the distinctive           
school of ancient philosophers somewhat disparagingly termed ​kynikoi (or ‘dog-like’) by           
other more elitist and academic strands of ancient philosophers can be said to further              
develop and accentuate the ethical distance with regard to the political space, the Cynics              
concomitantly purify this irreducible ethico-philosophical Socratic irony, not to         82
establish and hide it away in certain privileged spaces, but rather to defiantly put it on                
public display. With Cynicism, the ethical exteriority of the philosophical approach and            
its courage of truth assume a heightened, radicalized and often almost hostile public             
76 Plato​, Phaedo,​ 118a. Foucault, ​Courage de la vérité,​ 87-105/​Courage of Truth,​ 95-114. 
77 The Socratic ‘method’ is tried, tested and discussed in a number of Platonic dialogues, among others in                  
particular in ​Protagoras, Gorgias, The Republic, ​and ​Laches. 
78 ​Courage de la vérité,​ 135, 141/​Courage of Truth,​ 145-46, 152. 
79 ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres, ​299/​Government of the Self and Others​, 395. ​Courage de la vérité, 61/​Courage                   
of Truth​,: 64. 
80 Ibid., 61/64. ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres​, 308, 296/​Government of the Self and Others​, 335-36, 320. 
81 Raffnsøe, “What is Critique? Critical Turns in the Age of Criticism.” ​Outlines. Critical Practice Studies 18                 
(2017), 28-60, 47. 
82 Ibid., 51-52.  
Foucault Studies,​ No. 25, 8-54.  25  
Philosophical Practice as Self-modification 
expression. Practiced persistently as an openly displayed strangeness, ethical irony is           
here consistently developed and dramatized as a strangeness and queerness that is            
likely to cause public scandal. By the public, Cynic gestures of open defiance may even               
come to be perceived as war-like campaigns against the surrounding society. 
This blatant ethical defiance is, for example, put on display in the infamous story of a                
meeting between Diogenes the Cynic and Alexander the Great, as it is related by, among               
others, Dio Chrysostom of Prusa (A.D. 40-110). Dio relates how the powerful king leaves              
his court and his entourage to enter the public space and go visit the philosopher, who                
“cajoled no man by flattery but told everybody the truth and, even though he possessed               
not a single drachma, […] was the only man who lived the life he considered the best                 
and happiest.” When Alexander comes up to Diogenes and greets him, however,            83
Diogenes looks up at him from his barrel with a terrible glare like that of a lion and                  
orders him to step aside, as he happens to be warming himself in the sun. In the ensuing                  
face to face, Diogenes constantly provokes and challenges Alexander, also to make the             
point that Alexander’s monarchy is fragile and precarious since it depends on external             
factors, is consequently exposed to all sorts of misfortune and may be lost. By contrast,               
that of Diogenes is unshakable and cannot be overturned, since he needs nothing to              
exercise it. At the end of the day, Diogenes proves to be the real king. Only he is an                   
unappreciated king who may be difficult to recognize, due to the renunciation and             
deliberate endurance to which he exposes himself, a relentless work of self on self,              
always pushing back the limits of what he can bear, sacrificing himself and pestering              
others, yet all this to enable himself to take care of others. Ultimately, thus, the only way                 
of being a true king proves to be to behave like one and to continue to behave like one.  
In this manner, cynicism starkly and forcefully proclaims that philosophy is           
fundamentally not just a discourse, but above all a mode of life that has an essential                
connection with the question and practice of truth-telling. For Cynicism, philosophy is            84
a preparation for life which entails that one takes care of oneself by stripping existence               
of externals such as material possessions, food and unnecessary knowledge to attain a             
life without mixture and dependence that permits to state the truth and take care of               
others at all times. In Cynicism, consequently, the problem of the true life and the               
philosophical life is taken up and radicalized to such an extent that the Cynic’s life is                
turned into a demand and an assertion of the need for another life and an incessant                
combat for an other world in this world. With the Cynic figure of true royalty, the idea                 
of a true life is transposed into the theme of an other life; an other life whose otherness                  
the philosopher must lead to lead the change of the world, another life he must lead to                 
bear witness to an other world.  85
4. Ethical differentiation in ancient philosophy 
Whereas Platonism elaborates a “philosophical mode of being bound to the truth of             
Being and the practice of the soul,” which asserts the necessity of “the transformation of               
the soul” to such an extent that Foucault also characterizes this mode of being as               
“auto-ascetic,” Cynicism, according to Foucault, articulates a different but related          86
modality. 
83 Dio Chrysostome, “Fourth Discourse on Kingship"​, in ​Dio Chrysostom I, Discourses I-XI (1932), 171 (§ 8).                 
See Foucault, ​Courage de la vérité​, 252-57/​Courage of Truth, 275-83. ​Fearless Speech​, 124, 71/​Discours et vérité,                
240-48. 
84 ​Courage de la vérité,​ 216-17/​Courage of Truth,​ 234-35. 
85 Ibid., 264/286-87. 
86 ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres​, 308/​Government of the Self and Others​, 336. 
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In a very significant way … the Platonic modality … accentuates the importance and              
the extent of the ​mathemata, it gives knowledge of the self the form of the               
contemplation of self by self and the ontological recognition of what the soul is in its                
own being; it tends to establish a double division: of the soul and of the body; of the                  
true world and the world of appearances; in short its considerable importance is due to               
it having been able to link that form of the care of the self to the foundation of                  
metaphysics, while the distinction between esoteric teaching and the lessons given to            
all limited its political impact.   87
“The Cynic modality,” by contrast,  
reduces as strictly as possible the domain of the ​mathemata, it gives the knowledge of               
self the privileged form of exercise, test and practices of endurance; it seeks to manifest               
the human being in its stripped down animal truth, and if it held itself back in relation                 
to metaphysics and remained foreign to its great historical posterity, it left a certain              
mode of life in the history of the West, a certain ​bios, which, in its different modalities                 
has played a crucial role.   88
While Platonism brings a “metaphysical experience of the world,” giving rise to the             
“genealogy” of “the ​psyche, knowledge of self, work of purification, access to the other              
world,” Cynicism opens a “historico-critical experience of life,” giving rise to the            
genealogy of “the ​bios, putting oneself to the test, reduction to animality, battle in this               
world against the world.”  89
Despite this apparent contrast between the focus on the soul and its transports, on the               
one hand, and the embodied life, its passions and events, on the other hand, and despite                
a shift of emphasis between a temporality of edification which leads towards another             
world and a spatiality of leading a true life which is another life in an insolent finding                 
and showing oneself in the here and now, Platonism and Cynicism can nevertheless be              
considered as two contrasting but closely related modalities of an emerging           
philosophical mode of being. In both cases, a relative ethical independence, which            90
implies also a presence of relations, is introduced as a matter of vital importance and               
further developed. In this manner, philosophy makes the point that it is an             91
indispensable condition for good governance, for an equitable exercise of power and for             
the establishment of healthy relationships to constitute an ​ethos, “a way of being and              
doing, a way of conducting oneself corresponding to rational principles and founding            
the exercise of freedom understood as independence,” a way of conducting oneself that             
one develops, modifies, perfects and applies as an ongoing practice throughout one’s            
existence.  92
While Platonism may seem to make the case for this ethical differentiation most             
articulately and in the way that has historically proved more fraught with consequences,             
Cynicism can be said to flesh out this philosophical heroism in its most unmediated,              
uncompromising and pure mode. Predominantly passed on in the form of anecdotes or             93
stories ​(chreiai and ​apomnemoneumata) that were quite often funny episodes ​(paignia) but            
also worked as a serious challenge and exercise, the practice of Cynicism cultivated a              
87 ​Courage de la vérité​, 310-11/​Courage of Truth​, 338-39. 
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid. 289, 310/315, 349. 
90 Ibid., 293/319. 
91 Ibid., 309/338. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Ibid., 195-96/210-11. 
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new kind of traditionality of existence, different from the more well-known           
traditionality of doctrine; and whereas a traditionality of doctrine has the objective of             
recalling and re-actualizing a core of knowledge or thought that tends to be forgotten in               
the present, the traditionality of existence permits to restore the force of a conduct              
beyond moral enfeeblement. Presenting the concretization of a marked continuous          94
existence of otherness repeated as decisive in each and every moment, Cynicism            
constitutes the “matrix, the embryo” of a “fundamental ethical experience in the West.”             95
Cynicism makes graphic how the idea of an other life can be lived as a life whose alterity                  
leads to a change of the world in the here and now but is concomitantly only of                 
consequence if it is repeated as critical existential decision in each and every consecutive              
moment. Since it applies a principle of non-concealment literally, Cynicism becomes the            
heightened emblematic and diagrammatical expression that a philosophical life must          
appear as radically other than all other forms of life, in a way that challenges all other                 
forms of life; and it states in plain terms that this radical ethical distantiation is a ​conditio                 
sine qua non​ for assuming responsibility for one’s life and living an authentic life. 
In his last lectures, Foucault thus carefully further articulates crucial traits of the             
philosophical practice developed in the first section of this essay: a philosophical            
attitude characterized by a sustained meditative approach that takes the form of a             
modifying trial of oneself in the medium of thought made possible by an ethical              
differentiation from the world that permits to reconnect with the world.  
To be in a position to speak the truth in conjectures where it has become a daunting                 
challenge to do so, it is necessary to mind oneself: One must withdraw from the world                
and social interaction as they are immediately perceived and turn towards oneself in             
order to critically examine one’s own preconceived certainties and practice          
self-examination. When minding oneself, however, the desire is not to arrive at some             
evidential knowledge hidden in a private subjacent space at the core of oneself that can               
subsequently be transmitted and enables one to assume the position of the legislator, as              
still seems to be the ultimate goal of Cartesian meditation. Rather, the driving ambition              
is a limited retreat from the world that permits to elaborate ​an ethos, or a practical work                 
upon oneself that one develops and modifies as an ongoing practice throughout one’s             
existence, enabling one to re-engage in the world in a manner that is no longer dictated                
by the world as it is immediately perceived.  
As is evidenced in both Platonic and Cynic philosophy, ethical-practical          
differentiation as an ongoing modificatory work upon oneself entails a distantiation not            
only from received perceptions and opinions, but also from one’s own existence in one’s              
immediately existing pre-given form, a differentiation in and through which it           
re-appears in a mediated form. If it is to permit this ongoing practical work upon               
oneself, ethical differentiation must take the form of a retreat to a place that is not a                 
private space, isolated from the rest of the world. As has been made graphic by both                
Socrates and Diogenes, ethical differentiation instead presupposes and draws upon a           
retreat to a privileged social space devoted to an ongoing practical-ethical work upon             
oneself in an ongoing critical exchange with others, a practical work upon oneself that              
finds its ultimate test in its ability to become the touchstone for and manifest the truth                
for its surroundings.  
Thus, rather than its capacity to ascertain and represent knowledge, the decisive test             
of philosophical practice in its ethical differentiation, the check that permits one to             
94 Ibid., 194/208-09. 
95 Ibid., 264/287. 
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discern whether it is real, is philosophy’s ability to become an inherent, impersonal             
touchstone and criterion of truth for surrounding practices that challenges these to raise             
the bar. 
Consequently, philosophy’s ethical differentiation implies both a limited and decisive          
retreat from the surrounding world to a world self-modification. Ethical exteriority is            
limited insofar as philosophical practice, despite its ethical differentiation, remains in a            
close and critical, spirited exchange with its surroundings. It re-mains a crucial reality             
check for philosophy that it is able not only to confront and relate to the surrounding                
political world, but also that it is able leave its mark on and make a difference in the                  
world. Ethical differentiation remains decisive insofar as philosophical practice in this           
manner is able to become an ongoing manifestation of the need for an other life and an                 
incessant combat for an other world within this world. 
 PART III  
FOUCAULT’S PHILOSOPHICAL MODERNITY:  
PHILOSOPHY AS ETHICAL DIFFERENTIATION  
AND SELF-MODIFICATION IN MODERN TIMES 
In prolongation of his lectures on the constitution of ancient philosophy, Foucault can             
envisage as the general theme of examination a history of philosophy which is no longer               
so much concerned with philosophy as a forgetting or development of rationality, but             
rather with philosophy as a “series of episodes and forms – recurrent forms which are               
transformed – of veridiction.” This kind of examination would envisage philosophy in            96
its “allocutionary force” as an insistent and restive address to political, social, scientific             
fields or life forms from a position of relative exteriority in which it concomitantly finds               
and tests its own reality.  97
Insofar as Cynicism forms the heightened emblematic and diagrammatical expression          
of philosophical life as a witness or martyr of non-dogmatic truth that is not of this                
world, this history would also “show the permanent existence across all European            
culture of something which may appear as Cynicism itself (​le cynisme​),” re-appearing, of             
course, “under diverse forms, different practices, and styles of existence.”   98
This history would eventually lead on to the constitution of modern art as a field               
where received rules and forms are suspended in the name of the irruption of a naked,                
bare and true, existence still re-iteratively in the making. It would equally permit             99
perceiving the recurrence of revolution in Modernity as motivated by the fascination            
with true and militant forms of life, rather than caused by the captivation in a political                
project.  100
96 ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres,​ 322/​Government of the Self and Others​, 350. 
97 Ibid. 322/351. 
98 ​Courage de la vérité,​ 166/​Courage of Truth,​ 180. 
99 Ibid., 174-75/188-89. According to Foucault, “modern art is Cynicism in culture; the cynicism of culture                
turned against itself. And if this is not just in art, in the modern world, in our world, it is especially in art                       
that the most intense forms of truth-telling with the courage to take the risk of offending are concentrated”                  
(ibid., 174/189). 
100 Ibid. 169-71/183-84. 
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1. Foucault’s Enlightenment 
Even more importantly, however, Foucault’s elaboration of an attitude of ethical           
differentiation and self-modification in Antiquity and in his own work permits avoiding            
a reductive doctrinal perception of the Enlightenment and its aftermath in Modernity.            101
Instead of contenting itself with a mere debunking of a set of inherited dogmas or               
doctrines in order to replace them with more adequate knowledge and found a scientific              
discourse in truth, philosophy in the Enlightenment can be said, according to Foucault,             
to assume and re-assert the ​parrēsiastic function crucial for philosophy in Antiquity            
under present circumstances. In Enlightenment, philosophy equally takes the form of           102
an insistent and restive address to political, social, scientific fields or life forms from a               
position of relative exteriority, even as it finds and tests its own reality in this insistent                
and restive address. From this vantage point, the real crux of the Enlightenment is to be                
sought in the independent and self-dependent light that can be kindled and nurtured as              
a result of the indocile exercise of oneself in the activity of thought, rather than in the                 
establishment of new set of more adequate authoritative pieces of knowledge or            
mathemata. 
Foucault recurrently argues how this becomes particularly perspicuous in Kant’s          
determination of the Enlightenment, as it was first presented in his text known as “Was               
ist Aufklärung?” (“What is Enlightenment?”) from 1784​. According to Kant,          103
Aufklärung is to be understood as a decisive event in human history, namely humans’              
exit from their “state of minority (​Unmündigkeit​),” in which they find themselves as long              
as they submit themselves to the direction of others and are unable to muster the               
courage to govern themselves. 
When Foucault considers Kant’s canonical analysis, he is at first interested in the fact              
that Kant raises the question of Enlightenment in an article published in the journal              
Berlinische Monatsschrift, the mouthpiece of a group of liberal thinkers called the ​Berliner             
Mittwochsgesellschaft or Berlin Wednesday Society, which existed from 1783 until it was            
closed down in 1798 as a threat to public order. An article of this kind is thus not at the                    
time intended as a contribution to a discussion among scholars that would permit             
establishing true and lasting academic knowledge, but rather conceived as a           
contribution from a man of culture to a public discussion in order to aim for exactly a                 
discussion of the relationship between the writer and his public. Even more            104
importantly, however, the question taken up by Kant does not regard a rejected             
foundation to which the public should return or a finality towards which it is moving.               
Instead, Kant poses the question as an open question about what is going on right now                
in the present. In pondering the Enlightenment, Kant asks what kind of phenomenon is              
in question in the present. What does it involve and what can I – in posing the question –                   
say about Enlightenment and the present. The question is thus raised so as to include the                
one who poses the very question and the public he addresses.  
101 Michel Foucault, “Qu’est-ce que Les Lumières?” (2) [1983/1984], in ​Dits et Écrits IV, 686-87/Michel               
Foucault, “Kant on Enlightenment and Revolution,” ​Economy and Society,​ 15:1 (1986): 42. 
102 G​ouvernement de soi et des autres,​ 322-23/​Government of the Self and Others​, 349-50. 
103 Immanuel Kant, “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” [1784], in ​Schriften zur Anthropologie,              
Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik 1. Werkausgabe Band XI, ​ed. von Wilhelm Weischedel,            
53-61/Immanuel Kant, “An Answer given to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” [1784], in ​Kant‘s              
Political Writings, ​ed. Hans S. Reiss (1970), 176-192. For a more elaborate discussion of Foucault’s               
relationship to Kant, see Raffnsøe et al., ​Michel Foucault. ​426-54.  
104 ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres​, 9-10/​Government of the Self and Others, ​7-8. 
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Kant’s pondering on his contemporary world is first initiated as a questioning of the              
present as an event and secondly as an inquiry into the mode of being of this event and                  
what it implies. A third question implied by Kant’s text is how we can relate adequately                
to the present and its ontology. In this way, Kant opens the question of the ethical                
modality in which one can relate to the present: the question of an adequate ethos.               
Rather than pretending to evaluate the present from an Archimedian point outside time             
and space, philosophy with Kant seeks to relate to our own existence to this present and                
target it in our meditation.  105
At the outset, Kant defines Enlightenment as something first and foremost negative:            
Enlightenment is an exit ​(Ausgang) from man’s self-imposed tutelage. Kant thereby           
distances himself from an attempt to employ omens in determining the future that is              
unfolding. His aim is not to find out which age he belongs to; rather, he seeks to resolve                  
what has happened insofar as a phenomenon like the Enlightenment rises to such             
prominence in his present. As Foucault points out, Kant asks what difference the present              
or ‘today’ makes in history in relation to the past: “It is in the reflection on ‘today’ as                  
difference in history and as motive for a particular philosophical task that the novelty of               
this text appears to me to lie.” Since philosophy, for Kant, begins to concern itself with                106
the present in an archer-like relation, the present appears to philosophical reflection as a              
singularly irreducible and incomplete event that breaks with previous events. It thus            
becomes imperative for philosophy to target and flesh out the decisive moments of             
which it is part but on which it cannot help to reflect independently. 
Accordingly, the question of public interest and of interest for a philosophical            
interrogation that Kant focuses on is not so much the determination of the present as               
such but the question of the determination of “one particular element that is to be               
recognized, distinguished, and deciphered” “among all the other elements of the           
present.” And the decisive point for philosophy is to investigate “how this element is the               
bearer or expression of a process which concerns thought, knowledge, philosophy,” in            
order to indicate “in what respect and how the person who speaks as a thinker, a savant,                 
a philosopher, is himself a part of this process” and in order to test how he has a role to                    
play in this process in which he is “both an element and an actor.” It is thus not                  107
sufficient merely to perceive the present as an actual event. 
As Foucault mentions, this becomes clear in a passage from another small manuscript             
by Kant, namely “Der Streit der Fakultäten” (“The conflicts of the Faculties”), ​originally             
presented in 1798. Here Kant seeks signs of proofs that make it possible to speak about                108
progress for mankind. He identifies such indications in the French Revolution, which            
took off in the interim between the publication of ​Was ist Aufklärung? and ​Der Streit der                
Fakultäten. The revolution is here seen as a decisive event that results in a distinction               
between today and yesterday to such a degree that it becomes possible to speak of               
progress. On closer inspection, it becomes clear that Kant’s decisive point does not             
concern the concrete historical events. For Kant, the real event in this regard is the way                
in which the French Revolution was received in Europe. As the revolution unfolded, it              
105 Foucault, “Qu’est-ce que Les Lumières?” (2), 679-80/“Kant on Enlightenment,” 90. 
106 Michel Foucault, “Qu’est-ce que Les Lumières?” (1) [1984], in ​Dits et Ecrits IV, 568/“What is                
Enlightenment?” [1984], in ​The Essential Foucault. ​Selections from the Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984,              
ed. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose (2003), 48. 
107 ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres​, 12-13/​Government of the Self and Others​, 12. 
108 Immanuel Kant, “Der Streit der Fakultäten” [1798], in ​Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie,             
Politik und Pädagogik 1​, 351-368/Immanuel Kant, “The conflicts of the Faculties” [1798], in ​Kant‘s Political               
Writings​, 176-192. 
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generated enthusiasm and elation unrelated to the immediate personal loss or gain from             
what transpired. This enthusiasm suggests to Kant that there exists an inherent and             
deeply felt desire for progress within human beings. 
It is thus possible to claim that Kant is not primarily interested in the French               
Revolution as an empirical phenomenon but first and foremost takes an interest in the              
revolution insofar as philosophy can interpret it as the eruption of a new incisive              
challenge. With the French Revolution, something new occurs that attains          
incontrovertible importance for the onlookers. This event in the events, which comes to             
occur as a result of the actual occurrences, opens a horizon for thought and action that                
takes the form of a new challenge that cannot be ignored. 
In an important sense, the guiding interest for Kant in Foucault’s reading is not what               
actually happened. It is rather a transversal level that emerges and gains importance by              
creating new dispositions that shape the actuality of various succeeding events.           
According to Foucault, the revolution as an actual event risks being abandoned when             
history moves on, “but seen from the viewpoint where its specific content becomes             
unimportant, its existence attests to a permanent virtuality which cannot be ignored.”  109
The French Revolution proves to be a decisive contemporary event that is            
thought-provoking since it opens up new horizons in ways that can no longer simply be               
obliterated as it sets a new agenda. Thus this event provokes us to rethink the               
contemporary in order to stay vigilant to what seems to make itself felt as it shimmers                
through the haze: to what may still be to come and to what might have been. This                 
meditation remains important even if what it indicates might never be realized and even              
though the French Revolution as an empirical or actual phenomenon may fall decisively             
short of such great expectations. 
For Foucault, Kant’s discussion of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution           
raises an important question about the attitude one can establish to the contemporaneity             
of which one is part. By “attitude,” Foucault understands,  
a mode of relating to contemporary reality; […] a way of thinking and feeling; a way,                
too, of acting and conducting oneself (​agir ​et se conduire​) that at one and the same time                 
marks a belonging (​appartenance​) and presents itself as a task (​tâche​).  110
At the same time, he specifies that this is similar to what the ancient Greeks called an                 
ethos, or an elaboration of oneself that presents itself as a daunting task and that one                
continuously develops, modifies and applies throughout one’s existence in critical          
exchange with the contemporaneity within which one is situated. From the vantage            
point of Enlightenment philosophy, the age of Enlightenment presents the problem of            
which particular way of living becomes possible when one must relate personally to             
contemporary times as an event that is coming into being and that one is inscribed into.                
And Enlightenment philosophy responds by raising the difficult question: How can a            
mode of living or an ethical self-problematization and modification be attained that            
responds adequately to the fundamental challenges put forward by its epoch? 
109 “Qu’est-ce que Les Lumières?” (2), 686/“Kant on Enlightenment,” 96. Here, ‘virtuality’ and the ‘virtual’               
should be understood etymologically from the Medieval Latin ​virtualis, which designates ‘something which             
has an inner power or potential.’ Virtuality thus means the effective force contained and expressed in                
material or actual events. In understanding an occurrence as an event in Foucault’s sense, one focuses on                 
the forces and effects that are implicitly at work in the occurrence. 
110 “Qu’est-ce que Les Lumières?” (1), 568/“What is Enlightenment?” 39. 
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2. The reticent transgressive attitude of philosophical modernity 
Foucault claims that Enlightenment philosophy in Kant hereby establishes a ‘tradition’           
that not only continues and reignites the parrēsiastic strand of philosophy on modern             
terms but also stretches forward via Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche and Weber to Heidegger             
and the early Frankfurt School, represented by Adorno and Horkheimer. Consequently,           
Foucault considers his own thought in extension of the philosophical activities found            
there. In this tradition, philosophy is defined by its restive and challenging            111
relationship to the present of which it is part; and, according to Foucault, this tradition               
constitutes an important movement in the philosophy of modernity. 
Equally, this reticent transgressive attitude of philosophical modernity is detectable in           
Kierkegaard’s philosophy. In particular, it is markedly present when Kierkegaard, in an            
autobiographical note, compares himself to a number of his successful contemporaries.           
Whereas they were all benefactors of the age who had made a name for themselves by                
expanding and applying knowledge in order to make life easier and more coherent at a               
practical, organizational or mental level, Kierkegaard sets a radically different goal for            
himself:  
You must do something but inasmuch as with your limited capacities it will be              
impossible to make anything easier than it has become, you must, with the same              
humanitarian enthusiasm, as the others, undertake to make something harder.  112
It is a philosophical tradition that is not united by any common doctrine, but rather by                
the continuous return to a questioning of its contemporaneity, a questioning that must             
constantly be raised anew without receiving a definitive resolution. Kant’s texts           
therefore seem to mark “the discreet entrance into the history of thought of a question               
that modern philosophy has not been capable of answering, but that it has never              
managed to get rid of either.” Modern philosophy thereby becomes the philosophy that             
seeks to answer the question “raised so imprudently two centuries ago.” In extension             113
of this, Foucault claims,  
philosophy as the problematization of a present-ness, the interrogation by philosophy           
of this present-ness of which it is a part and relative to which it is obliged to locate                  
111 Michel Foucault, “The Political Technology of Individuals” [1982], in ​Technologies of the Self: A Seminar                
with Michel Foucault, ​ed. ​Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (1988), 145/Michel               
Foucault, “La technologie politique des individus” [1982], in ​Dits et Ecrits IV, ​813. 
112 Søren Kierkegaard, ​Afsluttende uvidenskabeligt efterskrift til de philosophiske Smuler [1846], in ​Søren             
Kierkegaards skrifter 1-28, Vol. 7, ​ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn et al. (2002), 171/Søren Kierkegaard, ​Concluding               
Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments [1846], in ​Kierkegaard’s Writings, XII, Vol. I, ​ed. Howard V.                
Hong and Edna H. Hong (1992), 166. Even though Foucault never discussed Kierkegaard’s oeuvre in               
writing, he was an avid reader of his work (see ​Herméneutique du sujet, 25, n. 46/​Hermeneutics of the Subject,                   
23 n46. For Kierkegaard a defiant questioning of the mode of life of his contemporaries and a radical                  
ongoing problematization of the self is of primary importance if one is to live an authentic life and establish                   
an authentic relationship to the world. Insofar as this kind of self-examination and self-modification is a                
precondition for establishing a rupture and a conversion with “ordinary existence” that permits access to               
another world within this life, Kierkegaard’s philosophy can be seen to continue a train of thought                
emblematically established with Cynicism. And provided that this conversion permits to “lead the same              
life in order to arrive at the other world,” Kierkegaard can be seen to bring a modern turn of this strand to a                       
heightened and emphatical expression: a turn inaugurated by Luther and Protestantism at the point when               
“Christianity became modern” (​Courage de la vérité,​ 228/​Courage of Truth​, 247).  
113 “Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?” (1), 562/“What is Enlightenment?” 32. 
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itself: this may well be the characteristic trait of philosophy as a discourse of and upon                
modernity.  114
In line with his understanding of crucial strands of philosophy in Antiquity and the              
Enlightenment, Foucault suggests that it might prove more fruitful to understand           
modernity as the adoption of a certain attitude instead of perceiving it as a specific               
epoch. Understanding modernity as an attitude of modernity and thus as “a mode of              
relating to contemporary reality,” “of acting and conducting oneself (​se conduire​) that at             
one at the same time marks a relation of belonging (​une appartenance​) and presents itself               
as a task,” permits the consideration of modernity as the re-actualization of the             
parrēsiastic practice in modern terms.  115
Foucault finds this attitude of modernity in the poet Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867),            
who presents it in an emblematic manner. In “Le peintre de la vie moderne,” Baudelaire               
describes the modern as the “ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent.” For Baudelaire,            116
however, being modern is not equivalent to simply confirming this movement or the             
experience that all that is solid melts into air. Rather, it implies taking up an attitude of                 
ethical distantiation that rebels against mere changeability. In distinguishing itself from           
a mere subservience to the dominant tendencies of the present age, the attitude of              
modernity is the effort to reconquer something eternal that is located in the transient.              
According to Foucault, “it is in the will to ‘heroize’ the present.” As was the case in                 117
Cynic defiance, the present is here sought glorified, but now by attempting to force              
something more from the mere momentary.  118
In Foucault’s view, the modern attitude found with Kant and Baudelaire is not just a               
relation established with the present but also an attitude toward oneself. The attitude of              
modernity thus also involves relating to the self in a certain way in order to establish a                 
new relationship to oneself and the world. Just as it is not merely a question of accepting                 
the present but reviving it, the modern self-relationship is not merely an issue of              
accepting that self in the fleeting moment or reestablishing it in a more basic sense.               
Rather, it involves relating to oneself as an ongoing meditative process in order to make               
this self “the object of a complex, difficult and painstaking elaboration of oneself.” One              
must make oneself the subject of an ascetic effort: a self-cultivation that inhibits             
spontaneous or unmediated activity or self-realization in order to make new           
opportunities possible. Thus, the attitude of modernity and the activity of truth-telling in             
modernity regard human beings’ “inevitable, but also precarious and difficult “revolt           
against” themselves.  119
114 “Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?” (2), 680/“Kant on Enlightenment,” 89. 
115 Foucault highlights that he is inspired to envisage modernity as an attitude continuing Enlightenment               
when he “refers back to Kant” and adds that modernity perceived in this way becomes “no doubt, a bit like                    
what the Greeks called an ​ethos” (“Qu’est-ce que les Lumìères (1),” (1984), ​Dits et Ecrits IV: 568/“What is                  
Enlightenment?” 48). 
116 Charles Baudelaire, “Le peintre de la vie moderne” [1869], in Charles Baudelaire, ​Curiosités esthetiques.               
L’Art romantique (1990), 467/Charles Baudelaire, ​The Painter of Modern life, and Other Essays, ​ed. Jonathan               
Mayne (1964), 13. 
117 “Qu’est-ce que les Lumìères (1),” 569/“What is Enlightenment?” 49. 
118 For further development of this aspect, see Raffnsøe et al., ​Michel Foucault,​ 436-37. 
119 Foucault, “Qu’est-ce que les Lumìères (1),” 570-71/“What is Enlightenment?” 50.  
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3. The historicity of revolt  
It is, however, not only with Kant and Baudelaire that humans’ search for authentic              
forms of existence through troublesome revolt against themselves is given an exemplary            
expression. While reading Kant and Baudelaire, Foucault also sought to attain firsthand            
experience of such a contemporary revolt when he twice traveled to Iran in 1978 to cover                
the uprising against Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980) in a number of            
newspaper articles. The purpose of what Foucault termed an example of “ideational            120
‘reports’” is not to engage in a moral debate for or against what is being examined, but                 
to examine the ideas at work and what they may bring to a Western context. In Iran,                 121
Foucault was attracted to an ​ethos that he thought was present in the first phase of the                 
revolution. Here the people rebelled against not only the Shah’s secret police but also the               
Western processes of modernization and liberalization that the Shah represented.          
Indeed, Foucault emphasizes how the man on the street, as well as the high-ranking              
clergy, were attempting to create room for an otherwise nonexistent “political           
spirituality.”  122
It is not the immediate religious implications of this term in the Iranian context that               
Foucault finds interesting here. In a contemporaneous discussion held on the 10​th            
anniversary of another revolt – the May 1968 protests in France – Foucault suggests that               
the central aspect of such a political spirituality is “the will to discover a different way of                 
governing oneself through a different way of dividing up true and false.” Political             123
spirituality comes about in shaping and refracting the political space such that a             
transformation of the self and by extension the political arena becomes possible.  
In his closing remark on the Iranian Revolution, Foucault complains about the regime             
of terror that it led to but holds that it is a fallacy to claim that religious despotism and                   
governance by Mullahs was inherent in the Iranian uprising and its enthusiasm from the              
very beginning. To investigate where it might have led, Foucault remains loyal toward             124
the initial phases of the revolution and its implicit momentum. He retains a tension              
between the end of the revolution and the virtuality contained in the course of events.               
Thus, Foucault’s relation to the Iranian evolution is not unlike what he determined to be               
Kant’s relationship to the French Revolution. 
What immediately fascinates Foucault in the revolution is the revolt. To Foucault, this             
“movement through which a lone man, a group, a minority, or an entire people say, ‘I                
120 For a more elaborate discussion, see Raffnsøe et al.: ​Michel Foucault, 439-445. Cf also Foucault’s retrospect                 
discussion with Farès Sassine of his investigation of the Iranian uprisings published in English as Michel                
Foucault, “There Can’t Be Societies without Uprisings” [1979], in ​Foucault and the Making of Subjects, ed.                
Laura Cremonesi et al. (2016), pp. 25-51. 
121 Michel Foucault, “Les reportages d’idées” [1978], in ​Dits et Écrits III,​ 706-07. 
122 It had occurred to Foucault already at this early stage that “the problem of Islam as a political force is                     
essentially one for our time and the coming years. In order to approach it with a minimum of intelligence,                   
the first condition is not to begin by bringing in hatred” (Michel Foucault, “Réponse de Michel Foucault à                  
une lectrice iranienne” [1978], in ​Dits et Écrits III, 708/Michel Foucault, “Foucault’s response to Atoussa H.”                
[1978], ​Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, ​210. Likewise, Foucault here stressed that one must not ascribe                
him to any conception of an Islamic spirituality and government replacing the previous dictatorship.              
Instead, Foucault attempted to examine what he considered an interesting moment in this “political              
spirituality.” 
123 Michel Foucault, “Table ronde du 20 mai 1978” [1980], ​Dits et Écrits IV: ​30/“The Impossible Prison”                 
[1980], in ​Foucault Live, ​275-86. 
124 Michel Foucault, “Inutile de se soulever?” [1979], in ​Dits et Écrits III, ​552–553/Michel Foucault, “Is it                 
useless to revolt?” [1979], in ​Foucault and the Iranian Revolution. Gender and the Seductions of Islamism​, ed.                 
Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson (2005), 265-66. 
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will no longer obey,’ and are willing to risk their lives in the face of a power that they                   
believe to be unjust” “seems” to be “irreducible.” The moment of the uprising or              125
revolt fascinates Foucault since it seems to be a part of history that is eradicable in the                 
sense that no power, even the most totalitarian, has been “capable of rendering it              
absolutely impossible,” and even “Warsaw will always have its ghetto in revolt and its              
sewers populated with insurgents.” Equally eradicable is the sense that it can never be              126
fully explained why people would prefer “the risk of death over the certainty of having               
to obey.” Finally, it is eradicable and fundamental in the sense that it constitutes the               127
condition for having a history at all. If there were no moments of indignation or revolt                
and existing power had universal domination, history would come to a grinding halt.             
The moment of revolt constitutes the precondition for history moving on, just like it              
ensures the continuation and development of sociality. 
In Foucault’s examination of the revolt, ethical differentiation and the irruption of            
truth in the form of an other life and an other world consequently acquires a very                
prominent status. Were it not for such acts of uprising, it would be difficult to imagine                
historical development and the dynamic exercise of power at all. Forming a condition of              
possibility for the appearance of history, ethical defiance and the irruption of a different              
truth give rise to history and affects how history happens. They seriously affect the              
mode of being of history, or historicity. 
The continuous re-enchantment that aggravation and revolt introduce into history          
means that history does not take on the character of a continuous developmental process              
where the succeeding events built on the preceding; rather, history takes the form of an               
ongoing change characterized by ruptures and upturns that result in previous states            
imploding so as to be recreated in new ways. Nonetheless, the revolt is not given the                
status of a ‘counter-power’ to be located beyond and transcending power relations.            
Rather, it is understood as an internal rupture in history and established power. Since              
such a rupture prevents established power and history from becoming absolute and            
closing in on themselves, it challenges and sets both into movement. In this sense,              
established power is challenged to exert more power to conserve and continue itself.  128
Likewise, Foucault’s fascination throughout his career with various        
“counter-movements,”’ be they religious Christian movements from the eleventh to the           
seventeenth century, contemporary Islamic movements or contemporary protests        
against incarceration or psychiatric hospitalization, is not largely due to their           
oppositional character, or even their eventual claims to be radically different and their             
ensuing pre-occupation with resistance. What fascinates Foucault in these movements of           
non-compliance is not so much their re-active character, but rather an element of revolt.              
As “revolts of conduct (​revoltes des conduites​)” these movements intrigue Foucault as            
they call for further examination in the realm of thought to remain attentive to where               
they may lead.  
In the same vein, Foucault mentions that his thought was inspired by various             
liberating movements originating in the 1960s and 1970s in so far as these movements              
developed and experimented with new forms of social interaction, new kinds of            
relationship between sexes and new aesthetic norms. Still, Foucault’s aim was not to             
125 Ibid. 791-92/263. 
126 Ibid. 791/263. 
127 Ibid. 
128 In Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power” [1982], in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow​, Michel                 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Second Edition (1983), he therefore points out how the              
exertion of power requires the “intransigence of freedom” (222). 
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adhere to these communities, nor to subscribe to specific norms, but rather to examine              
where these experiments might lead.  129
PART IV  
FOUCAULT’S CRITICAL EXCHANGE WITH PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE 
From the beginning of to the end of his work, Foucault can thus be seen to have a                  
longstanding exchange with philosophy conceived as a work of thought upon itself and             
a continuous self-modificatory practice in the medium of thought in its various historical             
incarnations. In and through this exchange, Foucault can concomitantly be said to give             
an outline of a not explicitly written genealogy of this kind of philosophy.  130
1. The establishment of an insubmissiveness permitting to state the truth and to             
remain attentive to the possibility of living another life in this life 
When examining the development of philosophy in Antiquity, Foucault discerns how           
the establishment of a new privileged relationship to truth in the form of a dramatic and                
risky truth-telling, in such a manner that it may serve to guide and organize political life                
as well as the lives of those in charge of political life, becomes a defining characteristic of                 
philosophy and an unremitting, existentially determining, ambition and challenge for          
the philosopher.  
To live up to this requirement, philosophy needs to go beyond the mere pursuit and               
acquisition of adequate knowledge. To be able to speak the truth in the face of power,                
philosophy must elaborate an ethos. It must become a sustained practical ascetic work             
on oneself, a life devoted to an ongoing self-transgressive self-modification, permitting           
one to ethically differentiate oneself from one’s surroundings and develop oneself           
independently in such a way that one is capable of leading a true life, a life devoted to                  
the manifestation of truth.  
By means of this initial declaration of independence, proclaimed in the form of an              
ethical differentiation, philosophical practice becomes an enduring ordeal that one          
undergoes at the hands of thought, an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought, that                
modifies one’s manner of being, perceiving and thinking in unpredictable ways as one             
enters the game of truth which one does not control. In and through its devotion to                131
becoming a manifestation of a binding truth that never becomes a personal possession,             
philosophical practice can develop a true life that makes room for another world within              
the given world. 
129 Michel Foucault, ​Sécurité, territoire, population. Cours au Collège de France. 1977-1978 (2004), 195-219/Michel              
Foucault, ​Security, Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at The Collège De France, 1977-78 ​(2008), 191-226. 
130 See Edward McGushin, ​Foucault’s Askesis. An Introduction to the Philosophical Life (2007), a most               
interesting and recommendable monograph, related to our study here, which aims to “present Foucault’s              
unwritten genealogy of philosophy” (xxiii). 
131 For Foucault an overriding theme of philosophy is the question and the task, “How to have access to                   
truth” (​Herméneutique du sujet, ​18/​Hermeneutics of the Subject​, ​20). Concomitantly, however, he repeatedly             
makes sure to stress the irreducibility and the alterity of truth. In the manuscript that ends his very last                   
lecture at the Collège de France, Foucault makes sure to stress “in conclusion” that: “there is no                 
establishment of the truth without an essential position of otherness (altérité); the truth is never the same;                 
there can be truth only in the form of the other world and the other life (l’autre monde et de la vie autre)”                       
(C​ourage de la vérité, ​311/​Courage of Truth, 340. Equally, the irreducibility and alterity of truth is a recurrent                  
theme of Foucault’s first series of lectures at the Collège de France (see Raffnsøe et al., ​Michel Foucault​,                  
22-23, 29-33. 
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With its initial declaration of independence, all the same, philosophical practice and            
existence does not sever all ties to political life to become an end in itself. In                
contradistinction to the sage who voluntarily retires, adopts a life in internal or external              
exile and keeps quiet, the philosopher has an essential duty and obligation to speak              132
and manifest the truth as plainly as possible in the given context to help his interlocutors                
realize who they are. 
As a consequence, philosophical practice as self-modification in the medium of           
thought does not declare itself satisfied with making way for an other world in this               
world. When fashioning his own existence to lead the true life, the philosopher is intent               
upon constituting an ethos that permits making an other world unmistakably present in             
this world, even to the extent that it might prove detrimental to his own existence. 
Consequently, the true philosophical life is the life that allows its ethos to be easily               
recognizable but precisely so in its privileged, enduring and stormy, critical relationship            
to political life. Avoiding complacency and flattery, philosophical self-transgressive         133
practice adopts and develops a transversal, restive and indocile approach to this world             
that questions and challenges it, committing it to live up to what can rightfully be               
expected of it and become attentive to the possibility of living another life in this life. 
 
2. The establishment of a transversal, indocile and non-compliant attitude to the            
present attentive to the virtual and the potential 
When examining the development of philosophy in modern times, Foucault discerns           
how important strands re-assume and further develop this transversal, restive and           
indocile approach to question established political life and received knowledge on given            
modern conditions. The parrēsiastic ambition of philosophy is re-assumed and          
reasserted in Kant’s contribution to the public, non-scholastic discussion of the           
philosophical heritage of Enlightenment. According to Kant, the essential heritage of           
Enlightenment that philosophy can claim and preserve is not adherence to a specific             
well-established corpus of knowledge. Rather, what can be assumed is a transversal and             
archer-like relation to the present and to received knowledge, an ethos of            
insubmissiveness that implies that one must leave the state of self-imposed minority in             
which one forgets oneself to examine, question and problematize established political           
life and power relations, unshakeable beliefs and knowledge over and over again.  
As becomes evident in Kant’s discussion of a particularly accentuated expression of            
Enlightenment’s urge to realize true and militant, insubmissive forms of lives, the            
French Revolution, what comes to the fore as crucial in philosophy’s parrēsiastic            
transversal, restive and indocile examination of present events is not so much what             
actually transpired, but rather the virtuality present in the events. What is to be retained               
by the philosophically inclined spectator as the decisive event in the revolution that can              
no longer be obliterated is the inner potential of the event: the predispositions and the               
predilections for a more authentic, truer life that generated widespread enthusiasm as            
they were revealed, despite the fact that this life was never fully and permanently              
realized. 
Equally, when Foucault takes interest in and investigates a series of revolts that             
predominantly occur at the end of the Middle Ages and in early Modernity, as well as in                 
his own times in Iran and Western Europe, what he finds particularly noteworthy for              
132 ​Courage de la vérité, ​7-20, 226-228/​Courage of Truth,​ 16-19, 245-247. 
133 Ibid. 206/223. 
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the purpose of his own philosophical investigation is not so much the final outcome or               
the results of these uprisings, but rather the attitude he found in people as they revolted                
and in the virtuality inherent in this attitude. He takes particular interest in an ethos of                
insubmission and a political spirituality of paramount importance in which one seeks            
not only to shape and refract the existing political space but also to modulate and               
transform one’s personal existence to pave the way for the arrival of an other world and                
an other life within the existing world. Furthermore, he strives to articulate how the              
advance of this restive attitude and its virtuality for the philosophically informed            
observer attain paramount importance for the development of history and its actuality.            
What comes to the fore in Foucault’s philosophical investigation of these social            
movements is thus the experiment inherent in the experimentation with new forms of             
existence and social interaction. 
3. A historicity of virtuality perceived by parrēsiastic philosophy 
In continuance with his examination of the parrēsiastic philosophical tradition in which            
restive intervention and self-modification go hand in hand, Foucault’s own          
philosophical investigation can equally be regarded as an original contribution to this            
tradition. 
While staying true to the concluding remarks of his inaugural lecture at the Collège              
de France in 1970 that philosophy must remain “present, uncertain, mobile all along its              
line of contact with non-philosophy, yet only existing by means of it,” Foucault equally              
takes pain to stress that if it were still to have a reason and a justification for its                  
existence, philosophy needed “to begin from a foundation that is at once arbitrary and              
absolute” and wonder if philosophy is “already there secretly present in what is not              
itself, starting to formulate itself half-aloud in the murmur of things.” Starting from             134
within political and social life, Foucault’s philosophical practice becomes a meditation           
on what transpires here.  
Yet, when trying to reveal “the sense, meaning and direction that non-philosophy has             
for us,” Foucault’s transversal, restive and indocile philosophy aims not primarily to            135
determine what has actually happened in the examined or to make graphic the             
normativity that guides it or that it counterfactually asserts. Instead, his parrēsiastic            
philosophy investigates the examined as a decisive moment in the history of revolt, in              
the history conceived as a history of care for oneself. This is a history where people exit                 
from their state of minority to take care of and guide themselves as they devote their                
lives to experiencing a truth that cannot be grasped in its entirety and that one can                136
only gain access to at the cost of and through a self-conversion and self-modification of               
the mode of conducting oneself that can be undertaken individually, but is often carried              
out in modes of living together that take the form of an “intensification of social               
relations.”   137
As people in the history perceived by parrēsiastic philosophy involve themselves in            
independently caring for themselves and in mustering the courage to unveil and            
manifest the truth, not infrequently so diligently that they risk their lives, they leave              
established normativity behind and begin developing new yardsticks that they project           
134 Foucault, ​Ordre du discours​, 77-78/“Discourse on language,” 236; trans. modified. 
135 Ibid. 78/236; trans. modified. 
136 ​Herméneutique du sujet,​ 412/​Hermeneutics of the Subject, ​431.  
137 Michel Foucault, ​Le souci de soi. Historie de la sexualité 3 ​(1984), 69/Michel Foucault, ​The Care of the Sel​f.                    
History of Sexuality 3​ [1984] (1990), 53. 
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and adhere to. However, what Foucault’s transversal meditative practice sets off when            
he examines this history of decisive moments is not what was realized or forestalled in               
these moments, but rather another very real plane of existence or aspect of the world,               
the virtual, as it makes itself felt, acts in and through this history of revolt and its                 
occurrences. Making itself felt as a force that modifies what occurs, the virtual             
constitutes the genetic condition of real experience. What Foucault’s meditative          138
practice brings to the front is not so much the direction in which this insubmissive force                
detectable in past or present events seem to have taken the participant or the              
investigator, but rather how this virtuality makes another world or a better life become              
perspicuously perceivable, even if they were never realized. 
4. Standing vigil for the day to come 
In this sense, Foucault’s philosophy is not an evening meditation that probes an existing,              
dwindling landscape in order to determine where one may already seem to have             
arrived. Rather, it is a meditation before the day that not only remains attentive to a day                 
that is still arriving, but aims to stay attuned to and articulate that which is still not yet                  
present in the arriving day and which may never become real. Re-opening the virtuality              
in the events, Foucault’s transversal philosophical practice can be said to have a radical              
anticipatory character. It takes the form of a meditation in advance on the virtuality              
shaping the events, before the fact and before it is revealed where they are likely to lead,                 
in order to move ahead of time to probe and reconnoite where they might lead or might                 
possibly have led in terms of an other life. In this manner, Foucault’s philosophical              
practice aims to stay vigil for the day to come. 
Accordingly, Foucault also characterizes his “historical-critical work upon ourselves”         
as expressing “an experimental attitude,” since it,  
must on the one hand open up a realm of historical inquiry and, on the other, put itself                  
to the test of reality, of contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is                
possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take.  139
Thus drawing as close as possible to that which precedes it to stir its certainty and                
modulate its virtuality, philosophy refracts and redirects it to such an extent that it              
begins to point in new directions and new lines of flight are established. Nevertheless,              140
since these lines of flight are refractions of the virtuality of the events examined, they are                
not to be conceived as routes that permit escaping it as they lead elsewhere. Rather, they                
138 Cf. Sverre Raffnsøe, “Beyond rule; trust and power as capacities,” ​Journal of Political Power 6:2 (2013),                 
249-250. 
139 “Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?” (1), 74/“What Is Enlightenment?” 46. 
140 Foucault and Agamben can thus be said to share not only an interest in virtuality, but also an interest in                     
or in what can be done. See Giorgio Agamben, “On Potentiality” [1986], “Absolute Immanence” [1996] and                
“Bartleby, or On Contingency” [1993], in ​Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. Daniel             
Heller-Roazen (1999), 177-184, 220-239, 243-271). Nevertheless, Agamben takes a particular interest in the             
“cardinal secret” that “all potential to be or to do something is always also potential not to be or not to do”                      
and thus foregrounds complete or perfect potentiality, or the potentiality not to (ibid., 245). By contrast,                
Foucault is particularly concerned with exploring concrete or specific potentiality, as he experiments with              
and probes what can be done in specific settings characterized by a specific virtuality. In continuance with                 
his interpretation of the Enlightenment, Foucault thus strives to examine “the present field of possible               
experiences” as “patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty” (“Qu’est-ce que Les Lumières?”               
(2), 686/“Kant on Enlightenment,” 119). Concerning the relationship between Foucault and Agamben’s            
conception of potentiality, see also Arne de Boever, “The Allegory of the Cage: Foucault, Agamben and the                 
Enlightenment,” ​Foucault Studies​ 10 (2010), 7-22. 
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are refractions that permit attaining the marginal region that borders on its limits. In              141
that sense, Foucault’s transversal philosophical practice remains a repetitive preface to           
transgression. 
5. Thinking and writing as exercises of self-conversion devoted to truth-telling and            
affirmative critique 
Thus, by taking the insubmissiveness virtually present in non-philosophy as its starting            
point to begin formulating half-aloud a philosophy already secretly existing here,           
Foucault’s philosophical meditation can itself become a sustained self-modification in          
the medium of thought. From beginning to end, Foucault’s philosophical course of            
thought can be regarded as an ongoing conversion in which he simultaneously seeks to              
know himself better and to take care of himself, not in isolation but as affected by a                 
larger social setting. Equally, his writing is a sustained modifying ordeal or test of              
himself in which he works hard to take care of himself by continually getting free of                
himself and continually re-affirming himself as he strays ahead of himself in the             
medium of thought. In and through this continual averse self-modification in the            142
medium of thought and writing, philosophical meditation elaborates an ethos, a           
practical work upon itself, that permits it to assert itself as a parrēsiastic activity: to               
speak truth in the face of established knowledge and power, and to vouch for its often                
provocative veridiction in a manner that contributes to their necessary re-organization. 
It is in accordance with this overall approach that Foucault also stresses how             
philosophy as a parrēsiastic activity should try to dispense with a commonplace            
negative judgmental form of critique as it continues to “dream about” and struggles to              
measure up to a different, more affirmative, kind of critique. It is, 
a kind of criticism that would try not to judge but to bring an œuvre, a book, a                  
sentence, an idea to life [faire exister une œuvre, un livre, une phrase]; it would light                
fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind, and catch the sea foam in the breeze and                  
scatter it. It would multiply not judgments but signs of existence; it would summon              
them, drag them from their sleep. […] Criticism that hands down sentences sends me              
to sleep; I’d like a criticism of scintillating leaps of the imagination.  143
As Foucault underlines, this kind of critique is on closer inspection “a non-positive             
affirmation” insofar as critical philosophy in this sense does not confirm or remain             
“bound by” any peculiar content in the affirmed, but instead affirms the virtuality in the               
141 Accordingly, Foucault’s remitting involvement in the present political field can be understood as              
parrhēsiastic attempts to examine, test and explore the potentiality in actual virtuality. This goes not only                
for his organization of a press conference in Madrid in 1975 to protest against death sentences given to 11                   
people by the Franco regime in a special trial that had no defence. It is equally the case when he                    
participates in a symbolic barricade of ​Prison de la Santé in 1977 to prevent the administrative extradition of                  
Rote Armee Fraktion defendant Claus Croissant for prosecution in Germany. Moreover, Foucault attempts to              
state the truth and explore further possibilities for action when he protests the Polish communist               
government’s repression of ​Solidarnosc in 1977 and subsequently drives a convoy of medicine and writings               
to Poland in 1982. For further examples of Foucault’s parrēsiastic interventions, see Raffnsøe et al., ​Michel                
Foucault​, 82-83. 
142 Cf. also the “very interesting” “aporia”, or impassable and insolvable opposition, in Foucault between               
the work to care of oneself and the endeavor to get free of oneself, or the ongoing tension arising from a                     
care of the self that should conclude in a getting rid of oneself highlighted in Giorgio Agamben, “Une                  
biopolitique mineure. Entretien avec Giorgio Agamben,” ​Vacarme​ 10 (January 1999), 4. 
143 Michel Foucault, “Le philosophe masqué” [1980]​, in Dits et Écrits IV, 106/Michel Foucault, “The Masked                
Philosopher” [1980] in ​Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 1, ed.                
Paul Rabinow (1997), 328. 
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event as it experiments with reinforcing and refracting it. Philosophy is affirmative since             
it “affirms limited being” by affirming “the limitlessness into which it leaps as it opens               
this zone to existence the first time.” Critique hereby becomes inherent and            144
affirmative, insofar as it takes an outset in a rupture in that which is examined in order                 
to confirm and experiment with deflecting this movement to explore potentiality. By            
actively pursuing this movement on its way and examining its further possible            
directions, critique affirms and transcends this movement from within. Through its           
confirmation of an ongoing historical movement, critique is able to seek out its boundary              
– not only boundaries that condition it, but also boundaries that it points toward. All the                
while Foucault characterizes critique as a certain kind of critical attitude, he can also              
determine this virtue or ethos as a “limit attitude” and “a work on our limits.” As one                 
leaves behind the established grounds of validity, one begins to create and commit to              
new normative guidelines. Foucault can therefore also argue that the critical attitude            
should “move beyond the outside-inside alternative” by beginning to perceive the limits            
of that which is well known and familiar as a threshold or transition to something new.               
 145
6. Cartesian evidence and Foucauldian meditation  
Though important, the philosophical tradition depicted here, accentuating the intimate          
link between the access to truth and the self-transformation necessary to access truth,             
nevertheless remains one specific philosophical branch among others. According to          
Foucault, it is even an approach to philosophy and knowledge that has increasingly             
been superseded by other strands since early modernity. 
While recognizing and commemorating the meditative character of Descartes’         
Meditations Metaphysiques, Foucault nevertheless understands Descartes’ meditation as        
“an event in thought” and “as a decisive moment that is still of major significance as a                 
decisive turning point in the history” resulting in the oblivion of the parrēsiastic             
tradition. As Foucault elaborates in his 1982 lectures, “the Cartesian moment” places            146
“self-evidence [évidence]” at the origin of and the end of the philosophical approach and              
knowledge, that is, “self-evidence as it appears... as it is actually given to consciousness              
without any possible doubt.” ​By doing so, the Cartesian line of action or procedure              147
establishes a certain relationship of the self to the self and to knowledge as decisive not                
only for acquiring knowledge and certainty, but also for establishing an authentic            
relationship to oneself.  148
144 Foucault, “Préface à la transgression,” 242/“Preface to Transgression,” 41; trans. modiﬁed. 
145 “Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?” (1), 574, 578, 574/“What Is Enlightenment?” 46, 50, 46. 
146 ​Herméneutique du sujet,​ 11/​Hermeneutics of the Subject, ​9.  
147 Ibid. 16/14. 
148 In his first course of lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault develops how Aristotle in the first lines                    
of his ​Metaphysics ​carries out an operation concerning “philosophical discourse itself” “as it has existed in                
our civilization” (​Leçons sur la volonté de savoir, ​7/​Lectures on the will to know, 5). ​In the opening passage of his                     
Metaphysics, ​Aristotle contends that “all men by nature desire to know” and states that “an indication of                 
this” is “the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness, they are loved for                   
themselves and above all others the sense of sight” (​Metaphysics, ​I, 980a 22). Thus inscribing knowledge in a                  
primordial will to know inherent in human nature, philosophy in Aristotle is able to lay the foundations for                  
itself while it conceives knowledge as an end or a value in itself. Philosophy and knowledge arise from and                   
are funded in a certain, singular and higher serene, form of desire, viz. curiosity, the desire to know for the                    
sake of knowing; and as desire to know, human curiosity is in turn inscribed within and belongs                 
specifically to knowledge and has the cognition of its object as its ultimate goal. As a consequence of and                   
through this turn, knowledge acquires the status of an absolute value and an end in itself; the subject of                   
desire and the subject of knowledge become one and the same; the desire to know is lodged within                  
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With the Cartesian moment, the subject’s relationship to itself and to the world             
essentially becomes theoretical. One is able to establish an adequate relationship to            
oneself and relate authentically to oneself only to the extent that one knows oneself; and               
one is only able to relate adequately to the world to the extent that one knows oneself                 
and possesses adequate knowledge of the world. The ‘know yourself’,” as developed in             
a privileged manner in philosophical thought, here becomes “a fundamental means of            
access to truth” according to Foucault, since Descartes puts,  
the self-evidence of the subject’s own existence at the very source of access to being,               
this knowledge of oneself (no longer in the form of the test of self-evidence, but in the                 
form of the impossibility of doubting my existence as subject).  149
Not only is this turn significant for “our modern mode of being subjects” for which the                
imperative to know becomes a fundamental way of relating to oneself, but it is              
concomitantly the event that lays the groundwork for and forms the somewhat invisible             
background for modern scientific thought and for modern philosophical thought as it is             
embodied in contemporary academic institutions.  
In prolongation of the Cartesian moment, philosophy becomes a primarily          
intellectual activity aiming for the discovery of truth in the form of propositional and              
systematic knowledge. According to this idea of “a philosophical practice indexed to the             
scientific model” in the modern sense of the word,   150
knowledge will simply open out onto the indefinite dimension of progress, the end of              
which is unknown and the advantage of which will only ever be realized in the course                
of history by the institutional accumulation of bodies of knowledge, or the            
psychological or social benefits to be had from discovered truth after having taken             
such pains to do so.   151
After the philosophical conversion to truth, any piece of information or knowledge may             
be regarded as factual evidence by shedding light on and being apprehended by the              
cognizing subject; but knowledge and the process of cognition cannot be perceived as             
inextricably connected with the subject’s transfiguration or qualitative change. For          
Foucault,  
knowledge; and knowledge becomes a “cause of itself and the desire directed towards it” (​Leçons sur la                 
volonté de savoir, ​19/​Lectures on the will to know, 18). Even though the Peripatetic is, toward the beginning of                   
the modern age, designated as “​the ​philosopher” by Thomas Aquinas and according to Foucault can be                
considered the early “founder of philosophy in the modern sense of the term,” Foucault makes sure to                 
stress that Aristotle should not be regarded as “the pinnacle of Antiquity, but its exception” (​Herméneutique                
du sujet, 19/​Hermeneutics of the Subject, ​17). ― According to Foucault, yet another important moment in the                 
disconnection of the access to truth and the transformation of the cognizing subject is to be sought in the                   
Medieval and Renaissance tradition of theology, reaching a pinnacle in Saint Thomas. Establishing itself as               
it re-assumes Aristotelian modes of thought, scholastic theology is able to maintain a strict correspondence               
between a cognizing god and believers able to apprehend him unmediatedly, on the condition that they                
believed. Due to this divide, a marked conflict between “philosophical thought and the demands of               
spirituality” can be seen to traverse Christianity from the end of the fifth to the seventeenth century (cf.                  
ibid., 28/26). Insofar as it prolongs this tradition, the modern conception of philosophy, knowledge and               
science can be characterized as onto-theological. 
149 Ibid. 16/14; trans. modiﬁed. 
150 ​Courage de la vérité,​ 217/​Courage of Truth,​ 236-37. 
151 ​Herméneutique du sujet,​ 20/​Hermeneutics of the Subject, ​19.  
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the modern age of the relations between the subject and truth begins when it is               
postulated that, such as he is, the subject is capable of truth, but that, such as it is, the                   
truth cannot save the subject.  152
Foucault considers the conversion toward and search for general knowledge as an end             
and a value in itself for the human subject remaining relative unaffected by its cognition               
as a characteristic strand in modern Western thought and philosophy from Descartes            
and Leibniz to Husserlian phenomenology and analytic philosophy.  153
With the described transition, the teacher, the academic, the modern professor and            
the technician have superseded the parrhēsiast as the characters who impersonate a            
privileged ability to access and state the truth. Concomitantly, truth become           
transmissible in the form of ​mathemata, or a set of docile knowledge that can be passed                
on, represented and professed unaltered from the master to the disciple, even as it can               
be recognized and kept in mind without presuming any specific alteration of the             
knower, until it may eventually disappear. Knowledge is essentially perceived as an            154
expertise, a sort of savoir-faire or knowledge how to that can be acquired and made use                
of independently of one’s personal habitus. In modernity, this turn is not only             155
detectable in and determines the conception and the shape of philosophy. It equally             
exerts a determining influence on the conception of knowledge and the           
institutionalization of knowledge in general. 
152 Ibid. 
153 “With the all too easy clarity of hindsight – of what Americans call the ‘Monday-morning quarterback’”                 
Foucault, in a late interview, indicates that there were “two possible paths that led beyond this philosophy                 
of subject,” but which he did not take: “The ﬁrst of these was the theory of objective knowledge as an                    
analysis of systems of meaning, as semiology. This was the path of logical positivism. The second was that                  
of a certain school of linguistics, psychoanalysis, and anthropology – all grouped under the rubric of                
structuralism. These were not the directions I took. Let me announce once and for all that I am not a                    
structuralist, and I confess, with the appropriate chagrin, that I am not an analytic philosopher. Nobody is                 
perfect. But I have tried to explore another direction. I have tried to get out from the philosophy of the                    
subject, through a genealogy of the modern subject as a historical and cultural reality – which means as                  
something that can eventually change” (“Sexualité et solitude,” [1981], in ​Dits et Écrits IV, 170/“Sexuality               
and Solitude” [1981], in ​Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, ​176–177). 
154 ​Gouvernement de soi et des autres, 228-229/​Government of the Self and Others, ​247-248. Foucault indicates                
how this turn and its implications are detectable in the figure of Faust. From the sixteenth century, when                  
the knowledge of intellectual knowledge begins “to advance its absolute rights over the knowledge of               
spirituality, Faust was the figure who, until the end of the eighteenth century, represented the powers,                
enchantments, and dangers of the knowledge of spirituality.” In this manner, Marlowe’s ​Doctor Faustus is               
described as “a condemned hero because he was the hero of an accursed and forbidden knowledge.”                
Nevertheless, as Foucault notes, Lessing is able to save Faust because, according to Lessing, Faust is able to                  
convert “the spiritual knowledge he represents” “into belief [in the] progress of humanity. The spirituality               
of knowledge becomes faith and belief in a continuous progress of humanity. And humanity will be the                 
beneficiary of everything that was demanded of spiritual knowledge, [that is to say] the transfiguration of                
the subject himself. Consequently, Lessing's Faust is saved. He is saved because he succeeded in converting                
the figure of the knowledge of spirituality into the knowledge of intellectual knowledge, as he resorted to                 
this belief [in] progress” (​Herméneutique du sujet, 296/​Hermeneutics of the Subject, ​309-310; translation             
modified). If one follows up this idea, it might seem that an important precondition for the salvation or                  
deliverance of the philosopher or the scientist of today is the ability to conclude the counter-Faustian pact                 
and make the wager suggested by Lessing. To be redeemed or delivered, he or she who knows must be                   
able to convert and transform the figure of the knowledge of spirituality into intellectual knowledge. He or                 
she must be able to convert devotion to the transfiguration of the subject into a belief in the progress of                    
humanity and to transform the practice of the transfiguration of the subject into a systematic contribution                
to the improvement of humanity, its skills and knowledge. 
155 ​Courage de la vérité​, 23-25/​Courage of Truth​, 28-30. 
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In a cultural and scientific landscape characterized by such salient features, Foucault’s            
philosophical practice stands out as an essentially different approach to philosophy and            
knowledge. The uniqueness of his coat-trailing parrēsiastic approach to philosophy and           
truth-telling may account for the quite strongly aggressive response his thought often            
prompts within the present setting. Nevertheless, the preoccupation with an updated           
form of existential and social meditative self-modification is equally what seems to            
justify the widespread contemporary appeal that Foucault’s philosophical practice         
elicits. 
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